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INTRODUCTION
1

The Hatch-Waxman Act is perhaps the most significant single
2
3
piece of consumer legislation of all time. By creating a pair of
4
simplified regulatory pathways for approval of copied versions of

1. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman)
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585. While this Act today is universally
known and cited as the Hatch-Waxman Act, in earlier years it was more commonly
known as the Waxman-Hatch Act. See Henry Grabowski & John Vernon, Longer
Patents for Increased Generic Competition in the US: The Waxman-Hatch Act After One
Decade, 10 PHARMACOECONOMICS (ISSUE 2 SUPPLEMENT) 110 (1996).
2. A recent study characterized the consumer benefit from the Act. It
sought to determine the “total savings that have accrued to the U.S. health care
system from substituting generic drugs for their brand-name counterparts,” and
the study concluded “that from 1999 through 2010 doing so saved more than
$1 trillion.” See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-371R, DRUG PRICING:
RESEARCH ON SAVINGS FROM GENERIC DRUG USE (2012).
3. These pathways are commonly known as the “paper NDA” and “ANDA,”
or “abbreviated new drug application,” options that became available through the
Hatch-Waxman Act and are discussed in detail infra Parts I, III.C.
4. The reference in this article to a “copied version” of a medicine refers to
a product that was developed by someone other than the originator of the
medicine. The originator of the medicine refers to the entity that originally
developed the medicine and secured regulatory approval to market the medicine.
As will be explained infra Part I, entities that develop copied versions of new
medicine typically make use of abbreviated regulatory filings—for example, the
ANDA pathway—to secure marketing approval for their copied versions.
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new drugs, the Act provided a legal and economic framework for
creating an entirely new industry: today’s generic drug industry. As
a result of the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic drug manufacturers
now supply American consumers with a wide spectrum of highquality, low-cost copies of an array of important medicines. The
economics of this new industry were made possible by dramatically
6
abbreviating the otherwise demanding requirements imposed on
the originators of new medicines to secure regulatory approval for
7
marketing of their innovations.

5. As used herein, the terms “drug” and “biologic product” have the same
meanings as in the MODDERN Cures Act of 2013. See H.R. 3116, 113th Cong. § 4
(2013) (“The term ‘biological product’ has the meaning given to that term in
section 351 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 262)” and “[t]he term
‘drug’ has the meaning given to that term in section 201 of the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).”). The more generic term “medicines” is
used herein to reference both drugs and biologic products.
6. Before a new medicine can come to market, three phases of clinical
trials—that is, trials involving human subjects—must follow the preclinical or
animal studies required to ethically justify proceeding to test an experimental
medicine in human beings. The last of the three phases of human trials
(Phase III) is the point at which substantial evidence of safety and effectiveness
must be established for a new medicine to be approved for marketing. See Clinical
Trial Phases, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. MED., http://www.nlm.nih.gov/services/ctphases
.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
7. The past one hundred years have brought about nothing short of a
revolution in the regulatory requirements to bring new medicines to market.
Following enactment of the Pure Food and Drug Act, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768
(1906), Congress created the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
oversee the safety of drugs under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
of 1938 (FDC Act), ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040. Subsequently, biologic products came
under federal regulation with the Public Health Service Act (PHSA), ch. 373,
58 Stat. 682 (1944), but it was not until the Kefauver-Harris Amendments to the
FDC Act, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962), that the current requirements
for safety and effectiveness for new drugs were put into place as a result of the
thalidomide tragedy. See Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods, In Whose Benefit? Explaining
Regulatory Change in Global Politics, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 23
(Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009). Today, a New Drug Application
(NDA) filed to secure FDA approval must contain “full reports of investigations
which have been made to show whether or not such drug is safe for use and
whether such drug is effective in use” before it can be given regulatory approval
for marketing. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A) (2012).
The path a drug travels from a lab to your medicine cabinet is
usually long, and every drug takes a unique route. . . .
....
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Since enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984, the
generic drug industry has come to dominate quantitatively the U.S.
8
prescription drug market. The unqualified success of the HatchWaxman Act in this respect helped pave the way for, indeed made
9
inevitable, the enactment of the Biosimilars Act in 2009. This law
was intended by its proponents to accomplish for copied versions of
10
biologic medicines what the Hatch-Waxman Act had accom11
plished for drugs.
Most drugs that undergo preclinical (animal) testing never even
make it to human testing and review by the FDA. The drugs that do
must undergo the agency’s rigorous evaluation process, which
scrutinizes everything about the drug—from the design of clinical trials
to the severity of side effects to the conditions under which the drug is
manufactured.
The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and Effective, FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm143534.htm
(last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
8. Approximately eighty-four percent of prescriptions in the United States
are for generic drugs. IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, DECLINING
MEDICINE USE AND COSTS: FOR BETTER OR WORSE? 15 (2013) (citing IMS HEALTH,
NATIONAL PRESCRIPTION AUDIT (2012)). At the turn of the century, these copied
versions of new medicines had less than fifty percent of the U.S. prescription drug
market.
9. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 804; Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-148, tit. VII, subtit. A, 124 Stat. 119, 804–21 (2010). The Biosimilars Act
was passed as a separate title of the same act that contained the provisions of law
often referred to as “Obamacare.”
10. Biologic products include medicines made through modern
biotechnological processes, rather than largely chemical ones. During the past
thirty-five years, microbes have been turned into medicine-making machines
capable of churning out a remarkable spectrum of new-era biologics. Working in
partnership with Genentech, Eli Lilly and Company launched the era of
recombinant DNA medicines made from microbes with the 1978 launch of its
human insulin product, Humulin. See Suzanne White Junod, Celebrating a Milestone:
FDA’s Approval of First Genetically-Engineered Product, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://
www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/ProductRegulation/SelectionsFrom
FDLIUpdateSeriesonFDAHistory/ucm081964.htm (last updated Apr. 10, 2009).
11. “Drugs” are medicines that are mostly the product of chemical synthesis.
These chemically-based medicines today are used in the treatment of a wide
spectrum of diseases. Nothing demonstrates the revolution in treatment made
possible through “new drugs” more than the emerging treatments for HIV/AIDS.
Stribild, Atripla, and Complera are one-pill-a-day oral medicines for the treatment
of HIV/AIDS. See ARTIPLA, http://www.atripla.com (last visited Feb. 1, 2014);
COMPLERA, http://www.complera.com (last visited Feb. 1, 2014); STRIBILD,
http://www.stribild.com (last visited Feb. 1, 2014).
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While the Biosimilars Act and the Hatch-Waxman Act
addressed fundamentally the same challenge (i.e., how to best craft
12
the regulatory/intellectual property (IP) interface under which
copied versions of new medicines might come to market through
abbreviated regulatory approval processes), the Biosimilars Act was
no clone of the Hatch-Waxman Act. As will be detailed later in this
article, key aspects of the regulatory/IP interface contained in the
Biosimilars Act differ in highly significant ways from the analogous
provisions in the Hatch-Waxman Act. In a nutshell, while the
Hatch-Waxman Act is highly patent-centric and effectively provides
that generic drug entry is determined by the expiration of the
innovator’s relevant patents, the Biosimilars Act is nearly patentagnostic and permits biosimilar products to be approved for
marketing only after an extended IP protection period that
Congress justified based on the heft of the required data package
containing the reports of the preclinical and clinical studies
needed for the original version of a new medicine to be approved
for marketing.
In making these two laws materially different, Congress was no
doubt signaling that, were it inclined to rewrite the Hatch-Waxman
Act from scratch today, it might well ground a twenty-first century
incarnation of the Hatch-Waxman law on concepts for a
regulatory/IP interface found in the Biosimilars Act. Given the
contemporary economics for bringing innovative new medicines to
market, the Biosimilars Act’s provisions were apparently regarded
by Congress as better reflecting the modern economic reality for
the originators of new medicines.
The brutality of biopharmaceutical innovators’ economics is
something that Congress could hardly ignore. Some current
12. As noted above, copied versions of new medicines gain access to the
market under abbreviated regulatory approval pathways specifically designed for
reviewing and approving such versions. However, there are limitations on the
availability of marketing approvals under these abbreviated regulatory pathways.
Approval to begin marketing under an abbreviated approval pathway is typically
based upon a set of intellectual property rules designed to protect the investment
of the originator of the new medicine. The limitations can include both access
limitations, e.g., moratorium provisions that prevent filing for regulatory approval
under the abbreviated pathway, and direct approval limitations (i.e., provisions
that define that date upon which a regulatory approval can become effective so
that the marketing of the copied version can commence). As will be discussed in
detail infra Part III.D., the limitation on the ability to approve a copied version of a
new medicine represents what is commonly called “data package protection.”
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estimates suggest that a $4–5 billion research and development
13
14
(R&D) investment —and decades of concerted effort —is now
required to bring a single new medicine to market. While much of
the biopharmaceutical industry R&D spending relates to
experimental medicines that fail to produce a commercial
15
product, among the R&D projects that do reach the market, only
about one out of every five to six new medicines ever earns back the
16
investment needed to create it. Additionally, many of the new
13. While the R&D investment needed to bring a single new medicine to
market varies depending upon the method used to make the calculation, the
industry R&D investment per new medicine coming to market is roughly $4 billion
simply using the ratio between $135 billion in annual R&D investment, see infra
note 21, and actual number of new medicines being approved from marketing
lying somewhere in the mid-30s. Both lower and higher figures can be found. Dr.
Francis Collins recently opined, “Developing a drug takes time and money: on the
average, around 14 years and $2 billion or more. More than 95 percent of the
drugs fail during development.” Francis Collins, Crowdsourcing Therapeutic Molecules
for Drug Discovery, NAT’L INST. HEALTH (June 18, 2013), http://directorsblog
.nih.gov/2013/06/18/crowdsourcing-therapeutic-molecules-for-drug-discovery
(last visited Mar. 23, 2014). Other estimates place the figure on the order of
$5 billion in R&D costs for every new medicine that comes to market, a figure
largely based on taking full account of the failed efforts noted by Dr. Collins.
A company hoping to get a single drug to market can expect to have
spent $350 million before the medicine is available for sale. In part
because so many drugs fail, large pharmaceutical companies that are
working on dozens of drug projects at once spend $5 billion per new
medicine.
Matthew Herper, The Cost of Creating a New Drug Now $5 Billion, Pushing Big
Pharma to Change, FORBES (Aug. 11, 2013 11:10 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites
/matthewherper/2013/08/11/how-the-staggering-cost-of-inventing-new-drugs-is
-shaping-the-future-of-medicine. Whether the best representation of the magnitude of the R&D investment required to bring a new medicine to market is
$2 billion or $5 billion, or somewhere in between, the implications for the IP
protection that is necessary to make the investment a viable one are substantially
unchanged.
14. The time from the initiation of a research program to getting a new
medicine to a patient is measured not in days or months or years, but decades.
PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., 2013 BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH INDUSTRY
PROFILE 32 (2013) (citing Michael Dickson & Jean Paul Gagnon, Key Factors in the
Rising Cost of New Drug Discovery and Development, 3 NATURE REVIEWS: DRUG
DISCOVERY 417, 417–29 (2004)).
15. Failed efforts directed to the creation of new medicines may now
consume at least ninety percent of a biopharmaceutical company’s R&D
expenditures. See Herper, supra note 13.
16. PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., supra note 14 (citing John A. Vernon
et al., Drug Development Costs When Financial Risk Is Measured Using the Fama-French
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medicines reaching the market today find themselves competing
with copied versions of earlier-generation medicines that are sold
by generic manufacturers—and available to patients—at nominal
17
prices.
It seems doubtful that the ying of the Hatch-Waxman Act
regime and the yang of the Biosimilars Act provisions will forever
coexist with one another. It cannot be good policy that copying
drugs is to be subject to one set of IP rules and copying biologic
products is to be governed by a materially different set of IP
provisions.
What may be the best next-generation thinking on defining a
common regime for copied versions of all new medicines to be able
to come to market can be found in a bill that is now pending
before Congress. This latest congressional effort is the MODDERN
18
Cures Act. The MODDERN Cures Act, according to its
proponents, has the potential to be a quantum improvement over
both the Hatch-Waxman Act and the Biosimilars Act in terms of
meeting the needs and expectations of patients for access to lowcost, high quality medicines—while spurring greater industry focus
on the development of new medicines of the greatest potential

Three-Factor Model, 19 HEALTH ECON. 1002, 1002–05 (2009)) (“Only 2 of 10
marketed drugs return revenues that match or exceed R&D costs.”); see also JIM
GILBERT ET AL., REBUILDING BIG PHARMA’S BUSINESS MODEL 1–2 (2003), available at
http://www.fredreichheld.com/bainweb/PDFs/cms/Public/rebuilding_big
_pharma.pdf (“Declining R&D productivity, rising costs of commercialization,
increasing payor influence and shorter exclusivity periods have driven up the
average cost per successful launch to $1.7 billion and reduced average expected
returns on new investment to the unsustainable level of 5%. . . . [This is]
significantly lower than the industry’s risk-adjusted cost of capital. Only one out of
six new drug prospects will likely deliver returns above their cost of capital, an
unattractive prospect for investors.”).
17. The nominal cost from many generic drug prescriptions is reflected in a
CVS Pharmacy promotion, which allows consumers to enroll in its Health Savings
Pass program that advertises “$1l.99 for 90 days—hundreds of generic
medications.” See CVS Pharmacy Health Savings Pass, CVS PHARMACY, http://www.cvs
.com/promo/promoLandingTemplate.jsp?promoLandingId=healthsavingspass
(last visited Mar. 3, 2014). In addition, the retail giant Walmart advertises
“$4 Prescriptions—Choose from hundreds of generic drugs.” See $4 Prescription
Program, WALMART, http://www.walmart.com/cp/1078664?povid=cat5431-env
198764-moduleB120712-lLinkFC44DollarPrescriptions (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
18. Modernizing Our Drug & Diagnostics Evaluation and Regulatory
Network Cures Act of 2013 (“MODDERN Cures Act of 2013”), H.R. 3116, 113th
Cong. (2013).
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benefits for patients (i.e., those addressing unmet medical needs).
Compared to the IP interface provisions of either the HatchWaxman Act or the Biosimilars Act, the MODDERN Cures Act is a
virtual paragon of simplicity and directness.
This article offers some commentary on the economic and
regulatory environment that led to the development of the
MODDERN Cures Act. It reviews the key provisions of the Act. It
then lays out the rationale that proponents of the legislation have
offered for its enactment into law.
I. THE REGULATORY JOURNEY FROM HATCH-WAXMAN TO THE
BIOSIMILARS ACT TO THE MODDERN CURES ACT
No one questions that the medicines that have come to market
since the end of World War II have been revolutionary in what they
have contributed to human health. These modern medicines,
including the approximately three-dozen new such medicines
being approved each year, stand wholly without precedent
19
throughout all of human history. The benefits to human health,
longevity, and productivity due to access to modern medicines,
were those benefits to be quantified in purely economic terms,
would certainly be in the trillions of dollars. Many more such
20
medicines may be on their way to market, driven by the massive,

19. The difference an innovative medicine can make can be seen in the fate
of Arthur Ashe, who was infected with the HIV/AIDS virus in June 1983,
diagnosed with HIV/AIDS in 1988, and died from complications of the disease in
February 1993, as contrasted with Earvin (“Magic”) Johnson who was diagnosed
with HIV/AIDS in 1991 and, more than 20 years later, continues to lead a full and
active life. Robin Finn, Arthur Ashe, Tennis Champion, Dies of AIDS, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 7, 1993, at 11, available at 1993 WLNR 3412281; Allison Samuels,
Magic Johnson: I Survived, DAILY BEAST (May 15, 2011), http://www.thedaily
beast.com/articles/2011/05/16/magic-johnson-20-years-of-living-with-hiv.html.
The difference in prognosis as between the two men was defined by an
experimental combination of new antiretroviral drugs that Mr. Johnson was
prescribed in 1994. Samuels, supra. Within two years, these experimental
medicines would be approved by the FDA and become the benchmark for
HIV/AIDS therapies.
20. The number of new biologic medicines alone under development by
biopharmaceutical companies exceeds 900. PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM.,
supra note 14, at 44.
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continuing R&D investments (currently $135 billion annually ),
being made by the biopharmaceutical industry.
Most of the medicines being prescribed to U.S. consumers
today are, however, not sold by the companies that originally
created them. Rather, the vast majority are supplied by generic
drug manufacturers. Today, copying of new medicines is
accomplished within a relatively few years from the time a new
medicine first reaches the market. The protection period for new
medicines is short enough to assure that the overwhelming majority
of all of the innovative drugs that reached the market before the
end of the twentieth century are, today, sold by copiers—not the
originators of those medicines. As noted earlier, copying new
medicines in this manner has been made possible because of new
regulatory approval pathways that have been put in place under the
Hatch-Waxman Act and the Biosimilars Act. Copied versions of new
medicines can be developed and regulatory approval sought under
the abbreviated approval pathways based upon a truncated set of
filing requirements that relate to the otherwise required testing of
new medicines for safety and effectiveness.
The abbreviated regulatory filing requirements are complemented with a companion set of IP rules that are unique to each of
the two laws. The IP-related provisions, among other aspects,
define the point in time at which regulatory approval can be
granted to the copied versions of a medicine under an abbreviated
regulatory approval pathway. The Hatch-Waxman Act, as noted
briefly above, established two separate abbreviated regulatory
approval pathways for copied versions of new drugs to come to
market. By far, the more important of the two pathways is the
22
“abbreviated new drug application” (ANDA) pathway. Under the

21. Over the past six years, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers
of America (branded as “PhRMA”) reports that its members’ expenditures on
R&D into new medicines have run between $46.4 billion and $50.7 billion. PHARM.
RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., supra note 14, at 2. The International Federation of
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations (IFPMA) puts the global
pharmaceutical R&D number at $135 billion. INT’L FED’N OF PHARM. MFRS. &
ASS’NS, THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AND GLOBAL HEALTH: FACTS AND
FIGURES 2012, at 5 (2012), available at http://www.ifpma.org/fileadmin/content
/Publication/2013/IFPMA_-_Facts_And_Figures_2012_LowResSinglePage.pdf.
22. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012) affords copiers the right to file “abbreviated
new drug applications” that effectively treat the abbreviated application as though
it contained all the reports of investigations that were required to secure approval
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ANDA pathway, a generic drug can be approved without repeating
any of the testing for safety and effectiveness that was required in
order for the original version of the new medicine to be
23
approved.
The IP-related provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act tightly
intertwine regulatory approval of copied medicines with the patent
rights of the originator. The Act dictates detailed procedures for
both the originator and the copier to follow in order to precisely
establish when a generic version of a new medicine might be
approved under one of the regulatory pathways for copied versions
of new medicines. These procedures are, under any measure, as
24
complex as they are prodigious. The Hatch-Waxman Act dictates
that the originator of a new drug cannot seek regulatory approval
25
for a new medicine without providing in its new drug application
(NDA) a listing of its relevant patents and their respective
26
expiration dates. Anyone seeking to copy a medicine using one of
the abbreviated regulatory pathways is required to make a
certification with respect to each of the relevant patents listed in
27
the originator’s NDA. Thereafter, regulatory approval of the
copier’s generic drug is tied to the expiration of the originator’s
patents, at least for those not successfully challenged under the
28
patent-challenge provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act. For a

of the original version of the new medicine, even if those investigations were
maintained as trade secrets.
23. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2) (setting out all the requirements for a complete
nontesting of a generic drug for safety and effectiveness and bars any additional
requirements from being imposed on the copier). No requirements for either
safety or effectiveness testing are imposed on an ANDA applicant.
24. See DONALD O. BEERS & KURT R. KARST, GENERIC AND INNOVATOR DRUGS:
A GUIDE TO FDA APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS ch. 4 (8th ed. 2013).
25. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b).
26. The term “relevant patents” is used in this article to reference the patents
that are described in 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (“[A]ny patent which claims the drug
for which the applicant submitted the application or which claims a method of
using such drug and with respect to which a claim of patent infringement could
reasonably be asserted if a person not licensed by the owner engaged in the
manufacture, use, or sale of the drug.”).
27. Id. § 355(j)(2)(vii).
28. When patents are challenged, the regulatory approval of the copied
version can take place immediately unless the sponsor brings a patent
infringement action within forty-five days from receipt of the challenge notice, or
another generic drug manufacturer has an unexpired, nonforfeited generic drug
marketing monopoly period. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii), (iv).
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patent challenge to arise, the copier’s patent certification needs to
state that the patent in question is not valid or otherwise will not be
enforceable against the copier’s product. If the originator then
undertakes to enforce the challenged patent—within a required
time period set by the Hatch-Waxman Act—the copied version of
the medicine in most situations cannot be approved unless the
29
patent expires or the challenge to the patent succeeds. As for the
originator’s patents, a single patent of the originator is entitled to
an extension of its term under the “patent term restoration”
30
provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act. The patent term restoration
provisions allow the selected patent to be extended to expire up to
fourteen years from the original approval date of the new
31
medicine.
As outlined earlier, the Biosimilars Act took a different
approach from the Hatch-Waxman Act’s patent-centric IP inter32
face. The Biosimilars Act does require a “patent dialogue” of sorts

29. The full complexity of these provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act are set
out in 21 U.S.C. § 355.
30. 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006).
31. Id. § 156(c)(3).
32. The “patent dialogue” provisions appear at 42 U.S.C. § 262(l) (2006).
Among the applicable provisions, within twenty days of seeking regulatory
approval for the copied version of a biologic product, the copier must provide the
originator “a copy of the [biosimilar] application . . . and such other information
that describes the process or processes used to manufacture the biological product
that is the subject of such application.” Id. § 262(l)(2)(A). The provision of this
information by the copier then triggers a sixty-day period during which the
originator must provide “a list of patents for which the reference product sponsor
believes a claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted” and “an
identification of the patents on such list that the reference product sponsor would
be prepared to license” to the copier. Id. § 262(l)(3)(A). The patent listing then
triggers another sixty-day period in which the copier may elect to supply to the
originator a listing of the patent for which the copier “believes a claim of patent
infringement could reasonably be asserted” against the copied product, but in any
event must provide, with respect to each patent identified by the originator, a
representation that the copier “does not intend to begin commercial marketing of
the [copied] biological product before the date that such patent expires” or “a
detailed statement that describes, on a claim by claim basis, the factual and legal
basis of the opinion of the [copier] that such patent is invalid, unenforceable, or
will not be infringed by the commercial marketing of the [copied] biological
product.” Id. § 262(l)(3)(B). A third sixty-day period then commences during
which the originator must provide, for each patent asserted to be invalid,
unenforceable or not infringed, “on a claim by claim basis, the factual and legal
basis . . . that such patent will be infringed . . . and a response to the statement
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to take place between the originator and a would-be copier of a
new biologic medicine. That dialogue, however, is mostly a
sideshow. Approval of the copier’s abbreviated regulatory filing is
made independently from any patent considerations. The patent
dialogue’s only effects are in the context of subsequent patent
33
litigation, should that litigation materialize. Instead of tying the
approval of biosimilars to patent rights, the Biosimilars Act bases
approval of these copied versions on the originator’s right to
protect its data package of preclinical and clinical investigations
that formed the basis for concluding that the original version of the
34
biologic product could be approved for marketing. Since the
existence and sufficiency of such data would be critical to any
conclusion that the copied version of the new biologic medicine
merits approval under the abbreviated approval pathway, the
Biosimilars Act protects the originator’s rights to the exclusive
regulatory benefit of its data package for a period of twelve to
twelve-and-a-half years from the original approval of the biologic
35
product.

concerning validity and enforceability.” Id. § 262(l)(3)(C). This set of exchanges
then sets the stage for a fifteen-day period of “good faith” negotiations over which
of the originator’s patents should be the subject of a patent infringement action.
Id. § 262(l)(4)(A). If there is agreement with the fifteen-day period, then the
originator has a thirty-day period in which to bring a patent infringement action
on each of the agreed patents. Id. § 262(l)(6)(A). If there is no such agreement
within the fifteen-day period, then the copier must provide to the originator
the number of patents the copier believes to be in dispute and for which a
patent infringement action would be appropriate to resolve the dispute.
Id. § 262(l)(5)(A). Thereafter, a period of up to five days ensues when the copier
and the originator must exchange lists of patents that each believes would be
appropriate for patent infringement litigation. Id. § 262(l)(5)(B)(i). The
originator is entitled to list at least one patent but cannot list more patents than
the number provided initially by the copier. Id. § 262(l)(5)(B)(ii). Within thirty
days from the exchange, the originator is obliged to bring a patent infringement
action on each patent that has been listed. Id. § 262(l)(6)(B).
33. See generally id. § 262(l).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(6), (7). While the regulatory approval of a copied
version of a new biologic product under the Biosimilars Act is not linked to the
patents that might exist on the new medicine, the ability to market the copied
version, once approved, is subject to patents that might be infringed by the
manufacture, use, or sale of the copied version. If such a patent is successfully
enforced, the marketing of the infringing copy may be enjoined until the patent
has expired.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A), (m)(2)(A).
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The MODDERN Cures Act, at least in one sense, picks up
where the Biosimilars Act left off. It clearly does so in terms of the
policy for crafting a regulatory/IP interface. Like the Biosimilars
Act, the MODDERN Cures Act disconnects regulatory approval for
copied versions of new medicines from patents and provides
marketing approval for copied versions of new medicines entirely
36
based upon a data package protection period.
For the MODDERN Cures Act, the data package protection
37
period is fifteen years. This period was intentionally made longer
than both the fourteen-year patent term restoration period under
the Hatch-Waxman Act and the twelve- to twelve-and-a-half-year
38
data package protection period under the Biosimilars Act.
36. House Bill 3116, unlike its predecessor House Bill 3497 from the 112th
Congress, contains a so-called “registration exclusivity” provision that operates
independently from either data package protection or the protection accorded
under any relevant patents. The registration exclusivity provision prohibits the
approval of a second original version of an approved medicine unless the clinical
testing for the other original version of the new medicine commenced before the
approval of the medicine accorded protection under the MODDERN Cures Act.
An exception to such regulatory exclusivity is made for a second original version of
a new medicine that exhibits greater effectiveness on a clinically meaningful
endpoint, greater safety in a substantial portion of the target populations, or
otherwise makes a major contribution to patient care. H.R. 3116, 113th Cong.
§ 201(e)(1)(C)(ii) (2013). The registration exclusivity provision does not appear
to play any significant role in the MODDERN Cures legislation, because it is
difficult to posit a scenario under which the registration exclusivity provisions
would be of any relevance. While there have been historical examples of two
originators seeking to develop the same medicine, each utilizing a nonabbreviated
approval process, there are no such examples that have arisen where one of the
originators commences its clinical studies after the other originator has already
secured regulatory approval to market. Were a second originator to do so, its
independent work would almost certainly be grounded on the exception—the
prospect of a significant clinical benefit for patients.
37. H.R. 3116 § 201(i)(4)(B).
38. The longer IP protection period in the MODDERN Cures Act, at least
compared to either the fourteen-year Hatch-Waxman Act patent term restoration
period or the Biosimilars Act’s twelve to twelve-and-a-half-year data package
protection period, is driven by the proponents’ desire to make the provision a
viable option for the originator of a new medicine. The actual protection period
for new medicines under the Hatch-Waxman Act or the Biosimilars Act can be
highly variable, as discussed infra Part III. The actual period of protection from
copied versions coming to market can exceed the fourteen-year patent term
restoration period, or fall short of the fourteen-year mark. The Biosimilars Act’s
twelve- to twelve-and-a-half-year protection period offers only a floor on protection
from copying a new biologic product. The biologic’s available patent life renders
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A second (and in some respects a much more profound)
feature of the MODDERN Cures Act is that, when its provisions
apply to a new medicine, they supersede all the patent term
39
restoration provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act. In their place,
the MODDERN Cures Act resets the term of each of the relevant
patents of the originator of the new medicine to the same fifteen40
year period that applies to data package protection. The
MODDERN Cures Act does so by extending the term of any patents
41
that would expire earlier and, if required, mandating a waiver of
protection under other patents that would otherwise expire later.
Thus, there is perfect alignment under the MODDERN Cures
Act between the data package protection period and the patent
42
protection period. This revolutionary feature of the MODDERN
Cures Act was specifically designed to eliminate the possibility for
patent litigation as an adjunct to market entry of copied versions of
the new medicine. In these key respects, therefore, the MODDERN
Cures Act would turn the litigation-laden Hatch-Waxman Act’s
regulatory/IP interface on its head. It would likewise moot the

the actual protection period variable; periods of protection from copied versions
of new medicines coming to market in excess of the fourteen-year patent term
restoration period remain possible. In contrast, the fifteen-year IP protection
period under the MODDERN Cures Act operates not just as a floor, but also as a
ceiling. Were this ceiling on protection to be materially lowered, this IP-based
incentive to direct new R&D investments into unmet medical needs would quickly
vanish. Thus, an IP protection period of fourteen years or less could render the
MODDERN Cures Act a far less effective incentive. All in all, the fifteen-year
period was crafted to represent the minimum period for effectiveness. As will be
discussed infra Part V, a lesser ceiling on protection would be difficult to justify—
on the basis of policy or economic considerations.
39. See H.R. 3116 § 201(e)(2).
40. Id. § 201(e)(2)(C).
41. The “patent waiver” provisions of House Bill 3116 are contained in
section 201(c). They provide that the originator of the new medicine must provide
“a waiver of the right to enforce or otherwise assert any [relevant] patent . . . which
may expire after the end of the [fifteen-year IP] protection period . . . against any
applicable product.” Id. § 201(c)(1)(A). The “applicable products” are any copied
versions of new medicines seeking approval under abbreviated approval pathways
of the Hatch-Waxman Act or the Biosimilars Act. The patents to which the waiver
provisions apply otherwise remain in full force and effect.
42. House Bill 3116, section 201(i)(4)(B) sets the protection period at
fifteen years from the date of the initial approval for marketing of a new medicine,
which applies to both approval for marketing of copied versions of new medicines
under section 201(e)(1) and patent term extensions under section 201(e)(2).
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need for the elaborate “patent dialogue” interface provisions of the
Biosimilars Act.
Finally, the MODDERN Cures Act seeks neither to amend nor
otherwise modify the Hatch-Waxman Act or the Biosimilars Act.
The provisions of the bill were crafted so as to sit atop these laws,
43
but not change either of them. It is an Act that can only be
applied to some, but not all, new medicines—its applicability is
limited to medicines being investigated to address unmet medical
44
needs. It is an Act that does not automatically apply to all new
medicines addressing unmet medical needs—the originator of the
medicine must request that the new medicine be subject to the
45
provisions of the MODDERN Cures Act, and the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) must then approve that request by
determining that the “unmet medical need” test has been met by
the studies for the experimental medicine on which the request was
46
based. This unique approach to a regulatory/IP interface comes
from a surprising source. It is not the product of a trade group or
industry initiative. It is the product of direct patient advocacy for
regulatory/IP policies that will result in creating better medicines.

43. H.R. 3116 § 201(e)(1) (superseding the timing provisions on approvals
under Hatch-Waxman Act and Biosimilars Act with respect to access to
abbreviated approval pathways); id. § 201(e)(2) (superseding the patent
restoration provisions for new medicines under the Hatch-Waxman Act).
44. House Bill 3116, section 201(i)(1) defines when a new medicine
addresses “unmet medical needs.”
45. House Bill 3116, section 201(a)(1) requires the developer of a new
medicine (the “sponsor”) to submit a request for designation of the new medicine
as a “dormant therapy.” The requirements for the request are set out in
section 201(b) and include a listing of the relevant patents and the provision of an
appropriate patent waiver of enforceability beyond the fifteen-year “protection
period.” Id. § 201(b). The developer needs to submit a clinical plan for the
development of the new medicine, and the request must be filed before seeing
regulatory approval for the new medicine. Id. § 201(b), (d)(1).
46. Id. § 201(a)(1). The requester of a designation may withdraw the request
up to the time the new medicine is approved for marketing. Id. § 201(d)(1).
Under this same provision, the FDA can revoke a designation if the developer fails
to provide periodic certification that the development of the new medicine for an
unmet medical need is continuing or if the developer fails to provide a sufficient
waiver of the right to enforce each relevant patent after the end of the fifteen-year
protection period.
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II. THE MODDERN CURES ACT: A PATIENT-LED REGULATORY
REFORM INITIATIVE
A.

The Congressional Origins of the Bill; Who Is Not Among Its
Proponents?

The MODDERN Cures Act, House Bill 3116, was introduced
47
by Representative Leonard Lance on September 17, 2013. The bill
superseded a bill with the same title, House Bill 3497, that
48
Representative Lance introduced in 2011. Like many bills
introduced in recent years, its title is acronymic. The “MODDERN”
in “MODDERN Cures” asserts that it is about “Modernizing Our
49
Drug & Diagnostics Evaluation and Regulatory Network.” Its
provisions are more ambitious than the acronym would suggest. As
noted above, the legislation’s target is not limited to just the
traditional drugs, but its provision would affect the approval of
50
both drugs and biological products.
In the 112th Congress, the original Lance bill garnered no less
than four dozen congressional sponsors, nearly equally divided as
51
between Democrats and Republicans. This bipartisan support
represented an auspicious start for this effort. Thus far at least, the

47. Press Release, Representative Leonard Lance, Lance Legislation Designed
to Help Patients with Chronic Diseases and Disabilities (Sept. 12, 2013),
http://lance.house.gov/press-releases/lance-legislation-designed-to-help-patients
-with-chronic-diseases-and-disabilities.
The bipartisan ‘Modernizing Our Drug and Diagnostics Evaluation and
Regulatory Network (MODDERN) Cures Act’ would update the
Nation’s drug evaluation process to encourage the discovery and
development of new treatments for chronic and rare diseases. The
measure would provide a pathway to bring promising new compounds
to market and establish a predictable timeline for the introduction of
generic equivalents. In addition, it will advance creative solutions for
developing companion diagnostic tests and create a system that
rewards efficiency and effectiveness to the benefit of all people with
chronic diseases.
Id.
48. H.R. 3497, 112th Cong. (2011).
49. H.R. 3116, 113th Cong. § 1 (2013).
50. See id. § 4.
51. See H.R. 3497 Bill Summary & Status: 112th Congress (2011–2012), LIBR.
CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:H.R.3497: (last visited
Mar. 3, 2014) (noting that there were forty-eight cosponsors for the original bill).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss4/2

16

Armitage: The Hatch-Watchman Act: A Path Forward for Making It More Modern

1216

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:4

bill has all the hallmarks of becoming a serious legislative
enterprise.
Unlike most bills that focus on medicines and their regulation
52
53
by the FDA, the usual trade association suspects—GPhA, PhRMA,
54
and BIO —are not to be found among its early proponents.
Notwithstanding that lack of visible biopharmaceutical industry
backing for the bill, an impressive listing of nongovernmental
55
entities endorsed the bill in the last Congress. According to the
bill’s proponents, its focus lies in enhancing patient access to
medicines and diagnostic tools that can address serious diseases.
Title I of the bill (not addressed in this article) deals with
diagnostic products, and Title II of the bill, “Capturing Lost
Opportunities for Patients,” provides the changes that would
56
impact the regulatory/IP interface for medicines.
52. Generic Pharmaceutical Association, or “GPhA” as it is now known, is the
trade association for the generic drug manufacturers. Its website indicates that it is
“the nation’s leading trade association for manufacturers and distributors of
generic prescription drugs, manufacturers of bulk active pharmaceutical
chemicals, and suppliers of other goods and services to the generic industry.” The
Association, GENERIC PHARMACEUTICAL ASS’N, http://www.gphaonline.org/about
/the-gpha-association (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). It is an amalgamation of the
Generic Pharmaceutical Industry Association, the National Association of
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, and the National Pharmaceutical Alliance. Id.
53. Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, or “PhRMA” as
it is typically branded, is the leading trade association for the biopharmaceutical
industry, headquartered in Washington, D.C. Its website describes its mission as
“to conduct effective advocacy for public policies that encourage discovery of
important new medicines for patients by pharmaceutical and biotechnology
research companies.” About PhRMA, PHRMA, http://www.phrma.org/about (last
visited Mar. 3, 2014).
54. Biotechnology Industry Organization, or “BIO” as it is universally known,
describes its mission as providing advocacy, business development, and
communications services for more than 1100 members worldwide. “It is our
mission to be the champion of biotechnology and the advocate for our member
organizations—both large and small.” About BIO, BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY ORG.,
http://www.bio.org/articles/about-bio (last visited Jan. 25, 2014).
55. The organizations sponsoring the bill were among the best-known
patient groups in the United States. For the listing of organizations that agreed to
be listed as sponsoring organizations, see Letter from Acad. of Physicians in
Clinical Research et al. to Representatives Leonard Lance and Jay Inslee,
U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 14, 2012), available at http://
www.nationalhealthcouncil.org/NHC_Files/Pdf_Files/MODDERNCuresSign-on
SupportLetter.pdf.
56. While Title I of House Bill 3116, “Advancing Diagnostics for Patients,”
contains provisions that would provide enhanced incentives for work on important
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The “Grass Roots” Origin of the Bill; What Is the National Health
Council?

Both House Bill 3497 and House Bill 3116 represent initiatives
57
developed and advanced by the National Health Council (NHC).
The NHC’s mission is to be an advocate for the work of so-called
58
“patient advocacy” organizations. Once the bills were introduced
59
in Congress, the NHC became the bills’ chief proponent.
The NHC statement on the introduction of House Bill 3116
was succinct in summarizing its views on the great promise for the
bill. It implicitly noted the role of the bill in providing a novel
interface between the intellectual property protection accorded to
a new medicine and the entry of copied versions into the
marketplace when that IP protection gives way, calling its novel
60
provisions “game changing legislation.” While the NHC call to

new diagnostic tests and capabilities, it contains only a single section—
section 103—that would provide enhanced incentives to promote the
development of new diagnostic products and techniques. These incentives would,
unlike the Title II provision, enhance—rather than replace—the protection
periods for new medicines currently available under law. H.R. 3116, 113th Cong.
tit. I–II (2013).
57. See generally NAT’L HEALTH COUNCIL, http://www.nationalhealthcouncil
.org (last visited Jan. 26, 2014).
58. See About the National Health Council, NAT’L HEALTH COUNCIL, http://
www.nationalhealthcouncil.org/pages/page-content.php?pageid=53 (last visited
Mar. 3, 2014)
Founded in 1920, the National Health Council is the only
organization of its kind that brings together all segments of the health
community to provide a united voice for the more than 133 million
people with chronic diseases and disabilities and their family
caregivers. Made up of more than 100 national health-related
organizations and businesses, the NHC’s core membership includes
the nation’s leading patient advocacy organizations, which control its
governance.
Id.
59. Exemplary of the NHC’s work is the Capitol Hill briefing for House Bill
3497 on February 28, 2012, providing a link to its Twitter conversation: #moddern.
Nat’l Health Council, Briefing on the MODDERN Cures Act (Feb. 28, 2012),
available at http://www.nationalhealthcouncil.org/NHC_Files/Pdf_Files/NHC
MODDERNCuresActBriefing.pdf.
60. See March 2013 Council Currents, NAT’L HEALTH COUNCIL, http://www
.nationalhealthcouncil.org/pages/page-content.php?pageid=154 (last visited Jan.
26, 2014).
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legislative action on these types of reform measures is not unique,
it and its patient advocacy affiliates have now accomplished things
that truly are unprecedented—by providing an innovative
regulatory/IP interface for congressional consideration, a specific
legislative proposal, and a cadre of supporters dedicated to
bringing profound changes to the way in which research on new
medicines is undertaken and copied versions of these new
medicines come to market.
Title II of House Bill 3116 would offer a dramatic
simplification of the intellectual property framework that provides
the economic rationale for investments to discover and develop
62
new medicines. That novel framework would remove inadequate
IP protection as a reason not to move forward to develop a new
agent that appears to have promising potential as a new medicine.
Additionally—and in a revolutionary departure from current law—
it would afford greater predictability, and vastly lower transaction
costs, for securing regulatory approval for marketing copied
63
versions of new medicines. An army of patent litigation lawyers
could be put to pasture, were innovators able to make widespread
use of the MODDERN Cures interface.
The remainder of this article sets out the case for proceeding
with the MODDERN Cures Act framework for defining—at least in
relevant part—a future regulatory/IP interface for copied versions
The NHC is again advocating for passage of the MODDERN Cures
Act during this Congress. This game-changing legislation was initially
crafted by the NHC and encourages the development of better
diagnostic tools and the co-development of diagnostics and drugs to
predict the safe, effective, and efficient use of medicines. The bill also
creates a new class of drugs called ‘dormant therapies’—medicines that
address conditions with limited or no treatment options—and
establishes a predictable timeline for the introduction of low-cost
generic equivalents.
Id.
61. See Robert A. Armitage, Creating the Best Medicines for Patients, Making
Medicines More Affordable, but Not Limiting Research to Medicines with the Best
Patents (2010), http://djf.typepad.com/files/armitage_paper.pdf (paper); Robert
A. Armitage, Creating the Best Medicines for Patients, Making Medicines More
Affordable, but Not Limiting Research to Medicines with the Best Patents
(May 2010), http://www.aipla.org/committees/committee_pages/Biotechnology
/Committee%20Documents/Committee%20Presentations/2010.Spring/Ohly.ppt
(presentation).
62. See infra Part III.
63. See infra Part III.
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of new medicines. That case begins with a background setting out
the manner in which IP protection for new medicines has evolved
64
in the Hatch-Waxman era. It then continues with the case to be
made for sufficient IP protection to sustain a viable, research-based
65
biopharmaceutical industry. The article concludes with the case
66
for defining a common IP protection period of fifteen years.
III. A PRIMER ON THE POST–HATCH-WAXMAN EVOLUTION OF IP
PROTECTION FOR NEW MEDICINES
The “game-changing” nature of the MODDERN Cures Act
regulatory/IP framework cannot be fully appreciated without an
understanding of how IP protection for new medicines has
operated historically and why the historically most important forms
of IP protection for medicines—patents and trade secrets—have
become increasingly problematic, even perverse, over the past two
decades.
A.

An Overview of the Evolution of IP Protection for New Medicines

As noted above, the most important forms of IP protection for
new medicines have historically come from patents and trade
secrets. The concept of data package protection as an additional
and distinct form of IP protection for new medicines did not exist
until it first emerged as a consequence of the Hatch-Waxman Act.
Its existence—indeed importance—was validated in the Biosimilars
Act, where data package protection plays a much more central and
essential role.
In the debates that led to the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman
Act, the consensus view was that the “gold standard” for IP
67
protection for new medicines should reside in patents. Through a

64. See infra Part III.
65. See infra Part IV.
66. See infra Part V.
67. The importance of patents is apparent from the debates that led up to
the patent term restoration provisions in the Hatch-Waxman Act. Originally,
Congress considered a separate bill that would have simply provided patent term
restoration—without the Hatch-Waxman Act provisions that were responsible for
the creation of the generic drug industry. S. 255, 97th Cong. (1981); S. 2892, 96th
Cong. (1980). These separate efforts began by noting the unfairness of according
the holders of medicine patents less than a full seventeen years of patent
protection.
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number of provisions, the economics of investing in the creation of
new medicines was entrusted to the patent system. The
underlying—but never tested—premise of the Hatch-Waxman Act
was that patents on new medicines could be routinely—and
successfully—invoked to prevent making and selling copies of a
68
patented medicine. The premise was that such protection would
suffice to sustain the innovative industry from what otherwise would
be the onslaught of price competition from copiers, which could
come within a few years from the time the original version of the
69
new medicine came onto the market.
Thirty years of experience under the Hatch-Waxman Act
would suggest that the patent system was never fully up to this task.
Moreover, in recent decades, patent protection has taken on an
increasingly perverse character when it comes to protecting new
medicines from premature generic competition. Patent protection
becomes perverse when some of the best candidates for
development as new medicines are left with some of the worst
[Senate Bill 255] . . . merely corrects the anomaly under which the
government grants a 17-year term of patent protection, but prohibits
the patented product from being marketed while the patent life ticks
away. There is no valid reason for a better mousetrap to receive 17
years of patent protection and a lifesaving drug less than ten years.
S. REP. No. 97-138, at 2 (1981).
68. Prior to the Hatch-Waxman era, there were few reported cases that
addressed the issues of validity and infringement of patents covering new
medicines. Generic drug entry seldom occurred until years after all relevant
patents on a medicine had expired. The originators of new medicines only very
rarely were involved in enforcing patent rights against one another. The vast
majority of new medicines coming to market, thus, never spawned even a single
patent infringement lawsuit.
69. Under Hatch-Waxman, absent patent protection, the only bar to
immediately seeking approval to market of a generic copy is found in 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2012). This provision sets up a five-year period in which such
filings would be barred. The five-year period corresponds, roughly, to the period
of time after the original version of a new medicine reaches the market during
which a would-be copier can discern whether the new medicine is successful
enough in the marketplace to merit developing a copy of the medicine, be able to
secure a source of supply for the active ingredient, complete any research needed
to develop a copied formulation that would behave similarly in a patient being
administered the copied drug, complete the required testing needed to
experimentally confirm the equivalence, and then pursue FDA approval for the
copied version. During this nominal period of protection, few new medicines
could ever hope to pay back to the originator the cost of creating them before
generic drug entry could occur.
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prospects for securing adequate patent protection. Patent
perversity sits alongside other features inherent in the patent
system that have exposed its frailty, at least when patents must stand
as the exclusive vehicle for providing protection of the investments
needed to create new medicines. The exact nature of the perversity
and frailty is detailed below.
Trade secret protection—in the pre–Hatch-Waxman era at
least—constituted an effective adjunct to patenting as a protection
for investments in innovation. As the originator of a new medicine
conducts expansive testing of an experimental medicine, it can
acquire trade secret protection with respect to the massive
70
compilation of data on the experimental medicine’s effects. That
protection can be perpetual; it can be sustained at least so long as
such data remains unpublished and is otherwise maintained in
secrecy.
The rise of abbreviated approval pathways for biopharmaceutical products, however, effectively trumps traditional notions of
trade secret rights that most other industry sectors enjoy. If a
generic competitor can come to market without repeating the work
that produced the compiled trade secret information, the
economic value of the trade secret is nullified.
In addition, growing requirements for data transparency with
respect to an experimental medicine’s effects, once approved for
marketing, inevitably diminish the effectiveness of trade secret
protection. If all but the details of a new medicine’s effects are
subject to public disclosure as a condition for gaining regulatory
approval for the new medicine, there is little room left for trade
secrecy to serve its traditional protective role. As patent protection
70. Under 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A), the originator of a new medicine must
amass, before seeking regulatory approval for a new drug, “full reports of
investigations which have been made to show whether or not such drug is safe for
use and whether such drug is effective in use.” These “full reports” of
investigations exist at a level of detail, including patient-level detail, that typically
and historically are not made publicly available—either by the sponsors of the
studies or by regulatory agencies that are charged with reviewing the reports.
Absent repeating the underlying clinical trials, there is no way such reports can be
duplicated and—absent some abbreviated approval pathway—no way in which a
competing product can come to market. Thus, the preclinical and clinical studies
on a new medicine have historically met the definition for a valuable trade secret.
They are compilations of information that produce economic value from not
being generally known by competitors and derive significant economic value from
access to the information.
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has increasingly taken on a perverse character, and trade secrecy
has been trumped by abbreviated approval pathways and demands
for greater data transparency, data package protection has taken
on a much greater significance as a means for protecting new
medicines from copied versions obtaining regulatory approval to
71
market. Even if this ascendant role for data package protection
had not arisen by design, it would have come by default.
The MODDERN Cures Act can be seen as an effort to optimize
data package protection, obliterate any possible patent perversity,
and obviate any need for reliance on trade secret protection of a
new medicine’s safety and effectiveness data. By applying a
common fifteen-year IP protection period to the originator’s
relevant patents and its data package, the Act wholly eliminates the
perversity with which the patent system can otherwise operate and
assures protection from copying, whether the data package is held
as a trade secret or fully available to the public.
Given the common IP protection period for patents and the
data package, the patent waiver requirements of the Act—a novel
and unprecedented derogation from the originator’s patent
rights—can be seen as a provision that is nonetheless fair to the
originator of the new medicine. The waiver arises, if at all, only
when the innovator requests the application of the Act. By securing
the protection under the Act, the originator has the assurance of
an extended period for IP protection. This voluntary waiver
imposed only on those originators who elect the MODDERN Cures
protection regime can be seen for what it is—a boon to the creator

71. Heroic efforts have been undertaken in recent years, especially in the
United States, to reform elements of the patent system to make it more
transparent, objective, predictable, and simple. The aim of the reforms, in part,
has been to make the patent system a more reliable source of protection for new
medicine for which patents have been secured. See Robert A. Armitage, The
America Invents Act: Will It Be the Nation’s Most Significant Patent Act Since 1790?, in
PATENTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE LEAHY-SMITH AMERICA INVENTS ACT (Deborah
Nathan & Phyllis Skuplen eds., 2012), available at http://www.mofo.com
/files/Uploads/Images/120206-Patents-21st-Century.pdf; Robert A. Armitage,
Understanding the America Invents Act and Its Implications for Patenting, 40 AIPLA
Q.J. 1, 133 (2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation
/armitage_pdf.pdf. Even with the success of patent reform efforts in recent years,
there remain numerous legal hurdles that need to be surmounted before a patent
can be found both valid and infringed and invoked to stop a copied version of a
new medicine from entering the market.
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and copier alike, neither of which will need to calibrate possible
patent enforceability risks as part of its business planning.
With this IP overview in hand, it is worth taking the above
perspectives and drilling down into somewhat greater detail on IP
protection for medicines, particularly the details of the evolution
from the pre–Hatch-Waxman era to the post-Biosimilars Act era.
B.

Patent Protection and Patent Perversity

The world of biopharmaceutical patenting changed in a
significant manner on June 8, 1995. That was the date on which a
new law, the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), took effect
and changed the measure for the term of protection for a patent. It
replaced a standard that had been in operation for more than two
72
hundred years and constituted a foundational premise for how
the patent term restoration provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act
operated.
Under the URAA, the term of protection for all new U.S.
patent filings was set at a fixed term of years from the original,
73
nonprovisional application date. In the post-URAA world, U.S.
patents would expire at twenty years from the original,
nonprovisional filing for the patent. What this meant, of course,
was that the new twenty-year patent term would start to run down
74
the date the patent was initially sought. Under the pre-URAA
patent law, a seventeen-year patent term existed under which the

72. See Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (authorizing “letters patent
to be made out in the name of the United States . . . granting to such petitioner or
petitioners, his, her or their heirs, administrators or assigns for any term not
exceeding fourteen years”). The use of a fixed term from the date of grant of
letters patents as the temporal measure of patent protection continued until 1995.
73. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103–465, § 101,
108 Stat. 4809, 4809 (1994), amended 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006) to provide a
twenty-year term of protection from the original filing date of an application for
patent. Section 154(a)(3) provides that a provisional patent filing date is excluded
from the twenty-year term, allowing a patent term to extend to twenty-one years
from the earliest provisional patent filing date. The URAA implemented the Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) text agreed as part of the
1986–1994 Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, WORLD TRADE ORG,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm
(last visited Mar. 23, 2014).
74. See also 35 U.S.C. § 154(b), which in some situations can result in the
adjustment of the patent term to account for delays in granting a patent.
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date a patent eventually granted was used as the start of the
75
seventeen-year protection period. The longer a patent took to be
issued, the later in time the patent would expire. If a patent took
ten to fifteen years to be processed, the patent would expire twentyseven to thirty-two years after the patent was initially sought.
In most technology sectors—and under many fact situations—
there is little discernable economic consequence between the preand post-URAA patent term measures. However, given the manner
in which biopharmaceutical patent filings must take place, and the
manner in which the marketing of new medicines is regulated, the
biopharmaceutical industry was uniquely—and negatively—
impacted by the URAA change in the measure of the patent term.
As noted above, patent protection, when at its theoretical best,
can be impeccable as a form of IP protection. This applies to
almost any product in any technology sector. Patenting has the
potential to provide effective and long-lived marketplace exclusivity
for a patent-protected product, including all manner of copied
versions of that product. For many innovative nonmedicinal
products, patent protection can be initially sought as the product
being engineered for commercialization. When the relevant
patents on the new product are issued at or near the time the new
product comes to market, it matters little how the patent term is
calculated—pre-URAA seventeen years from grant or post-URAA
twenty years from initial patent filing. Under either measure of
patent term, the originator of the product may well secure no less
than seventeen years of post-commercialization patent protection.
The key to securing a long-lived patent in such situations is
that the time between patent filing and commercialization ranges
from a few months to a few years. For many nonmedicinal
products, thus, the patent life under either measure of patent term
will prove not only longer than seventeen years from the initial
commercialization, but may typically be longer than the actual
commercial lifespan of the patented product. In these situations,
there is nothing perverse about patenting. Rather, patenting can
form the full and complete economic predicate for proceeding to
invest in the commercialization of the new product.
The same potential for categorical, long-lived protection from
copying through patents is—theoretically at least—available for new

75. Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 154, 66 Stat. 792, 804 (codified as amended
at 35 U.S.C. § 154).
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medicines, just as it is for other technology sectors. For a medicine
incorporating a novel active ingredient, patents on the active
ingredient can prevent any and all copied version of the medicine
from coming to market. In a similar manner, patents can protect
the methods of using a new medicine for its approved uses, thereby
holding at bay the ability of a copyist to market a copied version of
the medicine for the patented uses.
However, in practice, much can go awry in perfecting
adequate protection through patents. Patents on a medicine’s
active ingredient and approved uses, even though they are
theoretically capable of providing absolute protection from copying
during the term of the patent, may fail to so operate in practice. A
patent—no matter how strong and defensible it appears on its
face—is subject to a set of legal and equitable defenses to its validity
76
and enforceability. In patent infringement lawsuits, the complex
nature of the patent law means that the patent owner can almost
never be categorically certain of successfully asserting its patent
infringement claims.
Moreover, the ultimate viability of a patent as an effective IP
tool is assessed only at the time a would-be copier surfaces and the
originator of the new medicine brings an action to enforce the
patent. The facts that may be fatal to the patent’s validity may only
emerge during discovery after the patent litigation commences.
This potential for prolonged uncertainty over the effectiveness of
patent protection is not lost on the developer of a new medicine
when attempting to calibrate the viability of the investment needed
to create the new medicine.
In addition, the grant of a patent is never assured. The
standards for securing a patent are intentionally rigorous and
77
inflexible. Simply because a medicine contains a never-before76. See, e.g., 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.01 (2013).
77. The requirements for effective patent protection do not correlate with
any of the requirements for securing regulatory approval to market a new
medicine and the failure to meet any of the patentability requirements can either
doom the ability to seek a valid patent or, if one has been sought, allow the patent
to issue. A new drug must be shown to be “safe and effective” for the clinical uses
for which it is approved. Under the current patent statute, Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), the uncorrelated
requirements for patentability for a claimed invention in a patent filing can be
boiled down to the following:
 Sufficient differentiation from the prior art. “Prior art” is defined in a
simple and transparent manner as subject matter that, at the time of
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approved active ingredient or is to be sold for a never-beforeapproved use does not guarantee that effective patent protection,
78
once sought, can be secured for the medicine. A patent that is
an inventor’s patent filing, was already available to the public, or
available from a previously-filed U.S. patent or published U.S.
application for patent, subject to the inventor-friendly and
collaboration-friendly “grace period” and “self-collision protection”
provisions that have long been part of U.S. patent law.
 Sufficient disclosure in the inventor’s patent filing to identify the
embodiments of the claimed invention and enable them to be put to
a specific, practical, and substantial use.
 Sufficient definiteness in the inventor’s patent claims, to reasonably
identify the subject matter being claimed from that not being
claimed.
 Sufficient concreteness in the subject matter claimed, such that the
process or product being claimed is not excessively conceptual or
otherwise abstract.
Robert A. Armitage, The World’s First 21st Century Patent Law (Maybe): The LeahySmith America Invents Act, 4 LANDSLIDE, Sept./Oct. 2011, at 1, 1.
78. See Benjamin J. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standard of Patentability,
87 TEX. L. REV. 503 (2009) (discussing implications of just two of the requirements, novelty and nonobviousness).
The role of the patent system in promoting pharmaceutical
innovation is widely seen as a tremendous success story. This view
overlooks a serious shortcoming in the drug patent system: the
standards by which drugs are deemed unpatentable under the novelty
and nonobviousness requirements bear little relationship to the social
value of those drugs or the need for a patent to motivate their
development. If the idea for a drug is not novel or is obvious—perhaps
because it was disclosed in an earlier publication or made to look
obvious by recent scientific advances-then it cannot be patented. Yet,
the mere idea for a drug alone is generally of little value to the public.
Without clinical trials proving the drug’s safety and efficacy, which is a
prerequisite for approval by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
and acceptance by the medical community, that drug is unlikely to
benefit the public. Given the immense investment needed to fund
clinical trials on drugs and the ability of generic manufacturers to rely
on those tests to secure regulatory approval for their own products,
pharmaceutical companies are rarely willing to develop drugs without
patent protection. The novelty and nonobviousness requirements
make no concession for the development costs of inventions and thus
cause patents to be withheld from drugs that are unlikely to reach the
public without that protection. This gap in the patent system for drugs
has created a pervasive problem in the pharmaceutical industry,
causing firms to regularly screen their drugs during the research-anddevelopment process and discard ones with weak patent protection.
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never issued, of course, is a patent that can never be enforced
against a copier of a new medicine.
There are important medicines that will never enjoy effective
patent protection because no patents were ever even sought on the
new medicine. Great new medicines, no matter how outstanding
their clinical merit, do not automatically qualify for patent
protection. However, by far the most perverse aspect of the patent
system, arises from the more pervasive inability under the postURAA patent law to reliably secure long-lived patent protection for
the new medicines that are most deserving of—and most in need
of—protection from copied versions of those medicines being
approved for marketing. Perversely, many of the most significant
and important new medicines will typically be saddled with the
most short-lived patent protection.
Because the patent law in effect from 1790 to 1995 determined
the patent expiration date based upon the issue date of the patent,
if a patent on a new medicine did not actually issue until at or after
the time at which the new medicine was approved for marketing,
the effective patent life for the medicine could be a full seventeen
79
years or even longer. Using the same formula, a patent issuing less
than three years before a new medicine was approved for
marketing would have a patent life of more than fourteen years.
Since nothing in the pre-1995 patent law required that the
patent owner make undo haste to secure the issuance of a patent, a
patent owner could readily achieve fifteen years of patent life—or
even longer—even in situations where a new medicine took fifteen
years or more to go through the regulatory testing and review
process.
Under today’s patent law, because the most relevant (and most
significant) patents must typically be sought at the earliest point in
The harm to the public from the loss of these drugs is potentially quite
significant. Congress can easily avoid this problem by ensuring that the
successful completion of the FDA’s rigorous clinical-trial process is
rewarded with a lengthy exclusivity period enforced by the FDA.
Id. at 503.
79. Teresa Riordan, Patents, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1995, at 2, available at 1995
WLNR 3836838 (“Under the old system, a patent was valid for 17 years from the
date it was issued. Under the new system, a patent is valid 20 years from the date of
application. The change, while seemingly subtle, has enormous ramifications for
patent attorneys and inventors and the strategies they pursue to maximize patent
protection.”). See infra note 101, discussing the potential for patent protection
lasting more than seventeen years.
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the drug development process, an inverse relationship is created
between the length of testing required to get to market and the
available patent protection once marketing approval is secured. In
other words, the longer time period required for the necessary
testing to bring a new medicine to market, the shorter the effective
patent life that would remain for these most important patents
protecting the new medicine. The more difficult—and thus
longer—the road to the regulatory approval of a new medicine, the
shorter the remaining patent life on the date the new medicine
makes its first commercial sale.
A medicine can be more difficult to bring to market for any
one of several reasons. Each of these reasons correlates to the
potential importance of the medicine to clinical practice. In this
case a direct relationship applies—the more difficult the path to
gain regulatory approval for a medicine, the greater the potential
breakthrough the new therapy typically represents. Sometimes
medicine makers seek approval of a new medicine for a disease that
has never before been successfully treated with a drug—or seek to
treat a disease through a new mechanism of action that has never
been successfully employed. In other situations, the use for which
the new medicine is being investigated is for a chronic condition
rather than an acute episode. Similarly, medicines may be studied
for their ability to prevent a disease rather than simply treat the
disease once it is diagnosed. In each of these situations, the route
to approval of the new medicine will almost certainly prove to be a
more prolonged one. The required studies that are needed to
establish the merit of the medicine for a chronic, unprecedented,
or prophylactic use typically last longer, often much longer, than
for medicines where these complications are absent.
Because the only patents that have a realistic potential of
providing marketplace exclusivity—patents directed to the
medicine’s active ingredient and its medicinal uses—must be
sought early in the process of the development of a new medicine,
the patent term continues to run on these patents throughout the
medicine’s development process. By the time the medicines that
are the most difficult to develop—and are of potentially the
greatest importance to patients if successfully developed—finally
achieve regulatory approval, the remaining patent life may be
80
highly limited. In some situations, it may be totally exhausted.
80.

Discussed infra Part III.E are the so-called “patent term restoration”
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No one would intentionally design an IP system for the
protection of new medicines with a relatively longer IP protection
period for experimental medicines that have the shorter and
simpler pathway to regulatory approval and relatively shorter IP
protection periods for those seeking to develop the most novel,
unprecedented, and risky therapies. The very medicines that
need—and merit—the greater intellectual property incentive to
secure the investments needed to create them are the same
medicines that such perverse IP rules would disadvantage, making
it less likely that investing to create them would be a sound or a
wise investment. Patients, of course, would like access to the best
medicines, not medicines that happen to have the best patents.
The best medicines, prospectively at least, may well be those for
which patent protection might be so transient upon receiving
regulatory approval that it cannot serve as a basis to justify the
investment needed to create the medicine.
As a result, today, the patent protection of medicines, standing
by itself, particularly under the constraint of the URAA’s twentyyear, filing-based patent term, is at best flawed. Patent protection
under the post-URAA patent law will inevitably operate perversely.
To the extent patents serve as the chief form of expected IP
protection for new medicines, the patent law would inevitably steer
the originators of new medicines in the direction of those with the
best prospects for patents, irrespective of whether they would
represent the best in new medicines.
C.

Data Transparency and Abbreviated Approval Pathways Take a Toll
on Trade Secrecy

Trade secret protection can exist with respect to the detailed
reports of the studies on a new medicine that are necessary to gain
81
regulatory approval for marketing. Such details are typically not
made public by the sponsor of the investigations into the effects of
the medicine. However, trade secret protection, the detailed data
that defines a new medicine’s effects, sits in unavoidable tension
with the public interest in a full understanding of the new
medicine’s properties. The maintenance of trade secret protection,
surrounding the data used to demonstrate the merit of a medicine,
provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act that, on account of their inherent
limitations, tend to ameliorate, but not eliminate the perversity of the patent law.
81. See supra Part III.A.
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is seen by many as contrary to the public interest in full
transparency with respect to information used to determine that a
82
new therapy is safe and effective.
Such information is, at least, potentially of relevance to a
patient in deciding what therapy is best. It is of a potentially similar
importance to a physician grappling with a difficult prescribing
choice for an individual patient. In addition, the greater the
secrecy maintained as to the effects of a medicine, the lesser the
ability of independent entities to sift through the clinical data and
either confirm or dispute the interpretation of the data being
83
advanced by the medicine’s originator. This same consideration
applies as well to the conclusions reached by regulatory authorities
in deciding that a medicine can be safely and effectively used.
Thus, proponents of full data transparency, at the expense of
trade secrecy, assert that it can produce greater confidence in the
appropriateness of a new therapy reaching the market—or it can
produce a more sober sense of caution in using a new therapy.
Either way, the policy of requiring ever-greater disclosure of the
preclinical and clinical trial results leading to the approval to
84
market a new medicine is unlikely to abate. As ever-greater
transparency with respect to a new medicine’s effects has been
pursued by regulatory authorities, the ability to assert meaningful
trade secret protection in the preclinical and clinical investigations
that result in the regulatory approval of a new medicine has
lessened. Today, at least for some types of new medicines,
information on the medicine’s effects that is published in
82. See generally EUROPEAN MEDS. AGENCY, EMA/110196/2006, EUROPEAN
MEDICINES AGENCY POLICY ON ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS (RELATED TO MEDICINAL
PRODUCTS FOR HUMAN AND VETERINARY USE) 3 (2010), available at http://www.ema
.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Other/2010/11/WC500099473.pdf.
83. Erick H. Turner, How to Access and Process FDA Drug Approval Packages for
Use in Research, BMJ (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.bmj.com/content/347/bmj
.f5992#xref-ref-1-1.
Reporting bias leads to an overestimation of drug efficacy and
underestimation of drug harms, but its effects can be mitigated by
using unpublished data from drug regulatory agencies. Such data can
be useful to clinicians interested in going beyond the product labeling
and published literature. By comparing drug regulatory data with the
published literature, researchers can uncover reporting bias . . . .
Id.
84. See Peter Doshi & Tom Jefferson, The First 2 Years of the European Medicines
Agency’s Policy on Access to Documents: Secret No Longer, 173 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 380,
380–82 (2013).
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connection with the new medicine’s regulatory approval leaves
little to the imagination with respect to the properties of a new
medicine.
As more detailed information on a medicine becomes public,
assertion of trade secret rights based upon clinical trial results is
unavailing to the extent the publicly available information is in fact
sufficient to reach a justifiable scientific conclusion that any copied
version would be equally safe and effective in patients as the
original version of the medicine—at least so long as the copied
85
formulation contains the identical
active ingredient and
approximates the pattern of absorption and distribution in the
86
patient that is achieved by the original version of the medicine.
All of these considerations pale in comparison to the impact
that abbreviated regulatory approval pathways have had on trade
secret protection. If a copier need not provide the detailed reports
of preclinical and clinical investigations required for the original
version of a new medicine to be approved, the fact that such data is
maintained as confidential information is of no significance. The
secret information affords the originator no residual competitive
value or advantage if regulatory authorities are free to consider the

85. Under the Biosimilars Act, a copied or biosimilar version of a biologic
product will have active ingredients that are “highly similar,” rather than
“identical,” to the active ingredients in the originator’s product. “[A] biological
product may be demonstrated to be ‘biosimilar’ if data show that, among other
things, the product is ‘highly similar’ to an already-approved biological product.”
Drugs, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapproval
process/howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved/approvalapplications/therapeutic
biologicapplications/biosimilars/default.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
86. The extent of the “data package” that becomes publicly available at the
time of FDA approval runs from the dozens to hundreds of pages of
documentation:
FDA Approval Packages contain the research information on new
drugs or biologics submitted to the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) by drug sponsors that has been analyzed and
critiqued by experts at the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research
(CDER) or the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER).
Once a new drug or biologic is approved for marketing, the FDA is
required to make the Approval Package available to the public. . . .
Approval Packages are typically large, unwieldy documents ranging
from 50 to 1500 pages.
FDA Drug Approval Packages, U. IOWA DIVISION DRUG INFO SERVICES, http://www
.uiowa.edu/idis/FDA_Approval_Overview.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
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existence of such data when deciding if a copied version of the
medicine to which it relates can be approved.
Given that patent protection for new medicines may be
perverse and trade secret protection is moving into decline, if not
irrelevancy, the future of IP protection for new medicines may
increasingly move to the third form of IP protection—providing
the originator of a data package containing the preclinical and
clinical testing for a new medicine a protection period sufficient to
assure that investments needed to create a new medicine have a
reasonable prospect of earning back a fair return before a copied
version of the new medicine can be approved on the basis of the
contents of the originator’s data package.
D.

Data Package Protection Bars Regulatory Approval of Copies of the
Original Version of New Medicines Absent Submitting a Complete
Data Package

Data package protection bars the regulatory approval of a new
medicine for marketing under an abbreviated regulatory approval
pathway except in the situation where the copier has repeated
investigations of the type required to gain approval of the original
version of the new medicine or, alternatively, has secured a right to
reference the originator’s investigations. This type of protection
has effect, therefore, whenever the copier of the new medicine
attempts to take advantage of an abbreviated regulatory approval
pathway without repeating—or securing a right of reference to—
the studies required for the approval of the original medicines.
A data package protection period can arise from a moratorium
placed on the filing of an abbreviated regulatory approval
87
application. Self-evidently, the moratorium period barring the
filing of an abbreviated regulatory approval application necessarily
affords a minimum time period when an abbreviated regulatory
filing cannot be approved. The Hatch-Waxman Act, for the first
time in history, provided data package protection independently
from the existence of any trade secret protection applicable to

87. The moratorium periods are typically much shorter than the data
package protection period. Under the Biosimilars Act, the moratorium period
under the biosimilars pathway is four years. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(B) (2006). An
analogous moratorium period on the filing of an ANDA under the Hatch-Waxman
Act is four or five years, depending upon whether a patent challenge has been
made. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii), (j)(5)(F)(ii) (2012).
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88

originator’s clinical and preclinical data. Even in situations where
all the safety and effectiveness information relating to a new
medicine had entered the public domain, the Act imposed a fiveyear moratorium period when an abbreviated regulatory approval
application based upon the publicly available information could
89
not be filed. This provision had the effect of recognizing the
originator’s data package as an intellectual property right that was
entirely separate and independent from trade secret rights.
As a confirmation of the independence of data package
protection as a separate form of IP protection from trade secrecy,
this new form of IP protection was specifically applied to the socalled “paper new drug application” (paper NDA) provisions of the
90
Hatch-Waxman Act. A paper NDA can be filed based entirely
upon public information concerning a new medicine’s safety and
effectiveness, but cannot be filed until after the moratorium on
91
paper NDA filings has ended.
Aside from its role in assuring that data package protection
represented a form of IP protection, paper NDAs have a limited
use in securing marketing approval for copied versions of new
medicines. By far the predominate role is played by the second of
the two abbreviated pathways under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the
92
ANDA provisions. The ANDA provisions effectively superseded
the need for a paper NDA to secure regulatory approval of a
generic drug, because the ANDA pathway is available whether or
not the originator’s data package was wholly public, maintained as
93
a trade secret, or fell somewhere between these two extremes.
In making the ANDA pathway available, the Hatch-Waxman
Act effectively negated the value of the trade secret protection in
the safety and efficacy date related to the new medicine, at least
once the applicable moratorium period ended. Considering the
88. Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1590, 1595 (1984)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(b), (j)).
89. Id.
90. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2) (“An application . . . for which the investigations . . . relied upon by the applicant for approval of the application were not
conducted by or for the applicant and for which the applicant has not obtained a
right of reference or use from the person by or for whom the investigations were
conducted” were permitted to be filed, but only after the expiration of a specified
moratorium period.).
91. See id.
92. Id. § 355(j).
93. Id.
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paper NDA and ANDA pathways as a whole, the Hatch-Waxman Act
assured that the originator of a new medicine was no longer
required to maintain trade secrecy to have IP protection against
copied versions of the new medicine being approved until after the
end of the moratorium period. However, once the moratorium
period ended, the originator of a new medicine was not guaranteed
that maintaining trade secret protection for the regulatory data
would have any economic significance; any postmoratorium trade
secret rights that survived could be effectively nullified under the
ANDA pathway.
What the Hatch-Waxman ANDA pathway provided was
tantamount to a compulsory right to reference the secret content
of the safety and effectiveness data package of the originator of a
94
new medicine once the moratorium period ended. The HatchWaxman Act thus set “data package protection” limits on securing
the approval of copied versions of new medicines, even if no
relevant patents existed—and irrespective of whether the original
data package on which the approval of the new medicine was made
95
was entirely public or was maintained as a trade secret. At the
same time, it effectively stripped away trade secret protection in the
originator’s preclinical and clinical data package by effectively
treating a generic drug application as though it contained the right
to reference it, in lieu of repeating the studies needed for the
96
regulatory approval of the original version of the new medicine.
94. Because the application of the Hatch-Waxman Act was not entirely
prospective in its application, it raised an unavoidable Takings Clause issue under
the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Someone challenging the law
could have contended that
any proposal allowing the generic applicant to draw upon data
submitted by previous applicants, or to rely on information within the
knowledge and experience of the agency that had been generated by
previous applicants, would allow the ‘use’ of property for a public
purpose without just compensation. Because previously submitted data
might, in some forms, constitute trade secrets—a form of intellectual
property— . . . any disclosure or use of the information by the agency
would constitute a taking for which ‘just compensation’ is required by
the Constitution.
John C. Yoo, Takings Issues in the Approval of Generic Biologics, 60 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 33, 34–35 (2005). No such challenge was ever made and, after thirty years, has
become moot. The issue has been addressed in connection with the Biosimilars
Act.
95. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii), (j)(5)(F)(ii).
96. Id. § 355(b), (j).
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Overall, therefore, the Hatch-Waxman Act had the effect of
recognizing that this new form of intellectual property right it had
created—data package protection—played an independent and
essential role in the balance between incentives for innovation and
market access for copiers. That is, data package protection was
provided even for medicines with no relevant patent protection
whatsoever and for which the relevant data on safety and efficacy
were in the public domain.
When relevant patents do exist, data package protection under
the Hatch-Waxman Act would effectively exist so long as relevant
patent protection existed. The Act’s “patent linkage” provisions
97
were designed to secure this result. The Act then provided a
further provision that was designed to assure more adequate data
98
package protection, by assuring more adequate patent protection.
This new mechanism was “patent term restoration.”
E.

Hatch-Waxman “Patent Term Restoration” Ameliorates, but Does Not
Eliminate, Patent Perversity

By any measure, the “patent term restoration” provisions
constitute another historic element of the Hatch-Waxman Act.
Patent term restoration permits the term of a relevant patent for a
new medicine to be extended based upon the time consumed in
99
gaining regulatory approval for new medicine. The regulatory
period, codified in the Hatch-Waxman Act’s restoration provision,
is based upon the period required for clinical testing of the
medicine and the time during which the originator’s NDA is
pending approval by the FDA. The patent term restoration
provisions in the Hatch-Waxman Act contain exclusions and
exceptions that prevent a full restoration of the marketing time lost
to the R&D efforts, resulting in a statute that is remarkably
100
complex.
97. See infra Part III.F.
98. Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1598–1603 (1984)
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006)).
99. 35 U.S.C. § 156.
100. See id. The patent term restoration provisions limit the period of
extension to five additional years of patent life. Id. § 156(g)(6)(A). The actual
period of extension is limited to the “regulatory review period,” but only one-half
of the time during which a medicine was being investigated clinically can count
toward the five-year period. Id. § 156(c)(2). The preclinical testing period is
entirely disregarded. No matter how many patents might be relevant to a new
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In spite of all these complexities, the upshot of the patent term
restoration provisions, at least in the context in which they were
originally enacted in 1984, was that the originator of a new
medicine would have a reasonable expectation in many situations
of securing fourteen years of restored patent life and,
consequently, the patent-linked “data package protection period”
that would result would be a matching fourteen-year period. What
made the fourteen-year expectation a reasonable one in most
situations was the interplay between the patent term restoration
opportunity and the opportunity for delayed patent expiration
dates under the seventeen-year patent term.
It was not unknown, for example, for patent term restoration
to be unavailable for one or more of the most significant patents on
a new medicine, because the remaining patent life for such patents
was greater than 14 years at the time of the new medicine’s
approval. Indeed, there are examples of patent term restoration
being entirely unavailable because no relevant patents on the new
medicine providing less than 14 years of post-approval patent life
101
ever existed.
Under the pre-URAA seventeen-year patent term, the HatchWaxman patent term restoration provisions enabled a patent that

medicine, only a single patent can be extended and, if a patent was granted an
extension, it cannot be extended a second time. Id. § 156(c)(4). Finally, the
period of extension cannot exceed fourteen years from the date regulatory
approval was secured for the new medicine. See id. § 156(c)(3).
101. One example of how the pre-URAA patent law could operate to assure
patent protection of greater than 14 years can be found in the relevant patents for
the medicine EPOGEN. According to the medicine’s sponsor, Amgen Inc.,
EPOGEN was first approved for marketing in 1989. Amgen was unable to seek any
patent term restoration because no EPOGEN-related patents were ever issued that
had a post-approval patent life of less than fourteen years. Amgen’s patents most
relevant to EPOGEN were based on a patent filing initially made on December 13,
1983 (United States Application Serial Number 06/561,024). Had Amgen’s patent
filings been limited to the URAA’s 20-year term, each of the relevant patents based
upon this initial patent filing would have expired before the end of 2003.
However, among the patents that ultimately based on the 1983 patent application
was U.S. Patent 5,547,933, which was granted on August 20, 1996 and was entitled
to a 17-year patent term expiring in 2013. Thus without any patent term
restoration benefit under the Hatch-Waxman Act, EPOGEN was able to take
advantage of the pre-URAA patent law to achieve a 24-year effective patent life.
See Amgen Inc. Annual Report (Form 10–K) 11 (Feb. 29, 2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/318154/000119312512086670/d24142
0d10k.htm (last visited on Mar. 26, 2014).
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was issued more than three years prior to the date a new medicine
was approved to effectively “top off” the patent term to the
fourteen-year mark. As an example, for a patent issuing under the
pre-URAA patent law no more than three years before the
originator’s NDA was filed, the originator was assured of a
fourteen-year patent life––even if the FDA took an atypically long
five years to decide to approve the NDA. The date on which the
patent was initially sought would make no difference to the
calculation.
In contrast, the post-URAA law would frustrate the “topping
off” function of the Hatch-Waxman Act’s patent term restoration
provisions. If a post-URAA patent was initially sought a decade
before the NDA filing, the post-URAA patent law would limit the
restored patent term to twelve years instead of fourteen years if the
FDA then required a three-year period to approve the NDA once
filed––only with a one-year FDA review period could a fourteenyear patent life be achieved. If the patent was initially sought fifteen
years before the NDA filing, then only a seven-year restored patent
term would remain––one-half of the restored patent life that would have
been achieved under the pre-URAA patent law––should the FDA take the
same three year-period to approve the new medicine.
After the 1994 enactment of the URAA’s twenty-year patent
term, the assorted limitations contained in the patent term
restoration provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act were instantly
transformed into what might be characterized as serious flaws.
Absent the interplay between the issue-based patent term and the
patent term restoration opportunity, the fourteen-year limitation
on Hatch-Waxman patent term restoration effectively became a
ceiling, not a floor on available patent protection for many new
medicines. As a result, the Hatch-Waxman patent term restoration
provisions as they operate today are at best able to moderate, but
not remediate the perversity of patent protection. However, even
with patent term restoration, many of the potentially best new
medicines face the prospect of being saddled with the dimmest
prospects for adequate patent protection.
The URAA changes to the patent term represented, in
hindsight at least, a lost opportunity to remedy, rather than
reinforce, the perversity that results when the most difficult and
risky efforts at creating new medicines are rewarded with shorter
and more variable patent lives. In resetting the patent term
calculation from a protection based on the patent issue date to
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protection based on the original patent filing date, Congress might
have concurrently acted to reset the Hatch-Waxman patent term
restoration calculation to a fixed period of fourteen years from the
original regulatory approval date for the new medicine.
All the complexity of the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act’s patent
term restoration provisions could have been eliminated by simply
setting the terms of the originator’s relevant patents to expire at
fourteen years from the date of regulatory approval. Given the “fast
track” nature of the adoption of the twenty-year patent term, there
was neither the time nor the opportunity for Congress to
102
accomplish this objective.
Nothing, of course, would prevent Congress taking such a
remedial action now. The MODDERN Cures Act represents, at least
for medicines being studied for unmet medical needs, such a
remedial step. The MODDERN Cures Act not only eliminates the
possibility for patent perversity but goes a step farther. By setting a
fixed and certain fifteen-year IP protection period from the date of
the original regulatory approval of a new medicine, all uncertainty
and variability in the protection for the original version of a new
medicine and market entry for copied versions is ended––both for
103
the originator and the copier.
F.

Hatch-Waxman “Patent Linkage”––A Patent-Dependent Data
Package Protection Period Injects Patent Perversity into Data Package
Protection

The Hatch-Waxman Act tied together the concepts of data
package protection and patent protection through a then-novel
“patent linkage” mechanism. There is a virtual maze of provisions
in the Hatch-Waxman Act that implement the patent linkage
provisions. Effectively, the linkage provisions place a bar on
approval for marketing of either a paper NDA or an ANDA until
each of the originator’s relevant patents on the new medicine have
104
expired. The only exception that applies is the situation where a

102. For a discussion of the limitations on congressional consideration of the
1994 changes to the patent law due to the “fast track” authority of the President to
conclude trade agreements, see Natalie R. Minter, Fast Track Procedures: Do They
Infringe upon Congressional Constitutional Rights?, 1 SYRACUSE J. LEGIS. & POL’Y 107
(1995).
103. See H.R. 3116, 113th Cong. § 201(i)(4)(B) (2013).
104. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2), (j)(2) (2012).
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105

patent is successfully challenged by the copier. In brief, the “data
package protection period” becomes the same as the patent
protection period, at least for most patented medicines.
In hindsight at least, the Hatch-Waxman Act could justify its
relatively transient data patent moratorium periods that relate to
the filing of paper NDAs and ANDAs, because of the linkage
provisions that provide the actual marketing approvals for generic
copies would await for what might typically be a fourteen-year (or
sometimes longer) patent life for the new medicine. In this
manner, at least under the 1984 incarnation of the Hatch-Waxman
Act, copied versions of new drugs would appear in the marketplace
only after the originator of the new medicine had enjoyed a period
that, on its face at least, was reasonably sufficient to recover the
investment made in creating it.
As noted above, when the URAA changes to the patent laws
made the patent term restoration provisions of the Hatch-Waxman
Act less effective, it made the patent linkage provisions
correspondingly less effective. In effect, the magnification of patent
perversity through the new filing-based patent term was imported
into the data package protection provisions under the HatchWaxman Act. Just as patent protection periods have more
uncertain and more variable protection terms, so do the HatchWaxman’s data package protection provisions. The Biosimilars Act,
among other departures from the Hatch-Waxman Act, dispensed
with any patent linkage provisions. It employs a different structure
for data package protection, which the proponents of the Act
apparently believed would obviate the need for any type of linkage.
Expanding the data package protection as it relates to the approval
of copied versions of biologic medicines to at least twelve years
apparently formed the justification for dispensing with any form of
patent linkage.
Again, the MODDERN Cures Act takes the Biosimilars Act one
step farther. The data package protection period of fifteen years––
and the complete alignment of the period of patent protection to
105. The copier was required to certify, with respect to each relevant,
unexpired patent of the originator of the new medicine whether the copier was
seeking approval upon the patent expiration date or was prepared to challenge
the applicability of the patent to the copied version of the new medicine. These
two options are set out in 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(2)(A)(vii)(III)–(IV), commonly and
respectively referred to as the copier’s “Paragraph III” and “Paragraph IV”
certifications.
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an identical fifteen-year period––moots the need for any form of
patent linkage.
G.

The Hatch-Waxman “Generic Drug Monopoly Period”

The last of the pioneering IP provisions of the Hatch-Waxman
Act was yet another consequence of the decision to link the data
package protection period to the patent life in an effort to assure
an adequate aggregate protection period before approving copied
versions of a new medicine under an abbreviated regulatory
approval pathway. This last pioneering feature created a so-called
“generic drug monopoly period” in which one or more generic
drug manufacturers might preclude all their fellow generic
106
competitors from the market during a 180-day period.
Over the past thirty years, the generic drug monopoly period
may well have produced more profits for generic drug
manufacturers than from sales of generic drugs otherwise. The
marketing monopoly’s historic role as a driver of generic drug
industry profits was, however, highly attenuated by the Medicare
107
Modernization Act of 2003.
Today, all generic drug manufacturers that submit patent
108
challenges on the first day permitted for doing so now share in
the “monopoly.” For a typical new medicine, somewhere between
five and fifteen generic drug manufacturers may qualify as so-called
109
“first filers.” Having that many competitors sharing a monopoly
period is, of course, no monopoly at all. While this aspect of the
Hatch-Waxman Act, however flawed, was clearly well intentioned, it
has long outlived any usefulness that it might have had. From the
106. Under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv), the period is referred to as the
“180-day exclusivity period.”
107. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108–173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (codified as amended in
scattered provisions of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
108. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (“[A]n [abbreviated new drug] application may be submitted . . . after the expiration of four years from the date of the
approval of the [original version of the new drug] if it contains a certification of
patent invalidity or noninfringement described in [Paragraph IV].”).
109. See id. § 355 (j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(bb). The statute refers to the “first filers” as
“first applicants” and defines a first applicant as “an applicant that, on the first day
on which a substantially complete application containing a certification described
in [Paragraph IV] is submitted for approval of a drug, submits a substantially
complete application that contains and lawfully maintains a [Paragraph IV]
certification.” Id.
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beginning of the Hatch-Waxman era, it has routinely induced
patent challenges on the key patents that the originators of new
medicines have relied upon to invest in the creation of the new
medicine––rather than being confined to its original purpose as a
mechanism to challenge questionable, secondary patents.
In other situations, it has provided an unnecessary incentive to
challenge patents that would have been challenged with the same
vigor and to the same extent even absent any such an incentive.
Lastly, it has spawned an unseemly practice of “patent settlements”
that, while defended by some antitrust specialists, has been roundly
110
criticized in antitrust policy circles and elsewhere.
Unsurprisingly, just as the Biosimilars Act avoided patent
linkage, it similarly avoided instituting any analog to the generic
drug monopoly period. Under the MODDERN Cures Act, such a
monopoly period is unnecessary. There will be no relevant patents
whose enforceability will extend beyond the date when the data
package protection period has ended.
H. MODDERN Cures: One Answer to the Emerging Issues with the
Regulatory/IP Interface Under the Hatch-Waxman Act
Whatever its possible shortcomings, the Hatch-Waxman Act
has served well the intent of its legislative sponsors to create a
vibrant generic drug industry that would exist alongside an equally
vibrant industry committed to the discovery and development of
new medicines. Today, however, neither the copier industry nor
the originator industry looks much like its respective 1984
counterpart. The respective market shares of the innovator
industry and the copier industry have essentially reversed—the vast
majority of drugs consumed today are copied versions, not the
original.
While the Hatch-Waxman Act has left both industries with
business models that have thus far proven viable, warning signs
exist that suggest the Hatch-Waxman Act may not fulfill its 1984
intent indefinitely into the future. Unlike the 1984 version of the
Act, the contemporary version is more deeply infected with patent
perversity. This undercuts its ability to provide the consistent
promise of the fourteen-year protection period for new medicines
that was originally afforded through the combination of a
seventeen-year patent term based upon the issue date of the patent
110.

See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
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and the ability to use the patent term restoration provisions of
Hatch-Waxman to “top off” patent term for patents issuing too far
in advance of the marketing approval for a new medicine. As noted
earlier, by tying data package protection provisions to patent
expiration, the Hatch-Waxman Act simply imported patent
111
perversity into its data package protection provisions.
One possibility for improving the Hatch-Waxman Act might be
for the Act to morph into a law akin to the Biosimilars Act. Another
possibility might be for Congress to consider the missed
opportunity from the 1994 patent law changes to simply reset the
patent term for the relevant patents of the originator of a new
medicine to a fixed period of fourteen, seventeen or even twenty
years from the date a new medicine was originally approved––much
like the post-1994 patent term runs for twenty years from the date a
112
patent application was originally filed.

111. See supra Part III.F.
112. An analytical framework has been developed to better understand the
economic rationale for measuring IP protection periods from the date of
commercialization. Eric Budish et al., Do Fixed Patent Terms Distort Innovation?
Evidence from Cancer Trials 1, 14 (Sept. 5, 2013), available at http://economics
.mit.edu/files/8651, advances the proposition that filing-based patent terms have
negative, distortive impacts on making R&D investment decisions that could be
addressed through a commercialization-based measure for patent term, such as
that suggested in the below text:
Since in many industries firms are effectively compelled to file patents
at the time of discovery (“invention”) rather than at the time of first
sale (“commercialization”), legally fixed patent terms [measured from
patent filing dates] generate variable effective patent terms: inventions
that commercialize at the time of invention receive a full twenty-year
patent term, whereas inventions that take longer to commercialize
realize a shorter effective patent term. In the extreme, patents offer no
incentive to develop technologies that would take longer than twenty
years to commercialize. Thus, under a fixed patent term, research and
development (R&D) investments may be distorted away from
technologies with long time lags between invention and
commercialization. . . .
....
. . . Suppose that the length of the patent term must be fixed, but
that the patent clock can start either at invention or
commercialization. Given any patent term that runs from the date of
invention, there exists a patent term that runs from the date of
commercialization that strictly increases social welfare. In particular,
the optimal patent term that runs from the date of commercialization
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Yet another possibility, of course, would be for Congress to
enact the MODDERN Cures Act, with its fixed and certain fifteenyear IP protection period inclusive of both patent protection and
data package protection periods. For medicines that meet its
qualifications, it would assure that the prospect of transient,
questionable, or nonexistent patent protection would no longer
imperil the ability to invest in the testing required to bring a
promising new experimental medicine to market.
To gain a fuller understanding of why this type of a unified
approach to the regulatory/IP interface would merit serious
consideration, it is useful to undertake a detailed analysis of the
economic and competitive environments in which new medicines
have historically been protected from copying––and how those
factors have changed in ways that make the MODDERN Cures
approach a compelling model.
IV. INVESTMENTS IN MAKING NEW MEDICINES DEPEND UPON IP
PROTECTION SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY SUSTAINED, HIGH RISK
INVESTMENTS CAPABLE OF YIELDING COMMENSURATE RETURNS
The prospect of enjoying adequate IP protection has become a
necessary predicate for making the investment needed to create a
new medicine. Once a new medicine is approved and reaches the
market, it is essential to the ability of the medicine’s originator to
undertake the follow-on educational and marketing investments
that are required to develop a commercial market for those
medicines.
For an innovation-focused business model to have any hope of
survival, IP protection needs to serve as a bulwark against relatively
inexpensive copied versions of new medicines coming to market
during the limited period before such IP protection vanishes. The
business model for a generic manufacturer permits copied versions
of the most valuable and life-changing medicines to be profitably
sold into the marketplace at a nominal cost. For consumers, it has
made a month’s supply of hundreds of miracle medicines less costly
113
than a daily trip to Starbucks.
is superior to the optimal patent term running from the date of
invention.
113. The average price of Starbucks latte (Venti size) exceeds $4. See Starbucks
Latte (Venti size) Prices, HUMUCH?, http://www.humuch.com/prices/Starbucks
-Latte-Venti-size/_/819 (last visited Mar. 2, 2014). This compares with the
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The economic thesis for creating the new generic drug
industry with these characteristics was as simple as it is compelling.
The research-based biopharmaceutical industry is the consummate
high-risk business, both in its efforts to create new medicines and in
subsequent investments to get those innovations understood and
used by physicians and their patients. The difficulties of creating
even a single successful medicine is the stuff of legend.
There are no high-risk, low-reward businesses that can sustain
themselves over the long term. Investors in pharmaceutical and
biotechnology companies are not an exception. Where biopharmaceutical companies have failed to sustain an acceptable
114
return consistent with the risk the investment in creating new
115
medicines entails, they have disappeared. Investors in researchbased biopharmaceutical companies expect financial returns on
$4 generic drug prescription cost. See $4 Prescriptions, supra note 17.
114. The difficulties of sustaining a successful return on investment have been
well documented.
Over the course of the four years of this analysis, the [study’s]
cohort of 12 companies has launched 105 products and transferred
$770 billion of projected value into their commercial portfolios to the
benefit of patients. Over the same period, the research and
development (R&D) engines of these companies have pulled 167 assets
into late stage development, with a total risk adjusted value of $819
billion.
Despite these positive indicators, the projected return on
investment in innovation that the cohort’s late stage pipeline is
expected to deliver has continued to decline across the four years,
from 10.5 percent in 2010 to 4.8 per cent in 2013. The cohort result
hides wide variations in company performance. Some companies are
achieving higher rates of return and others are struggling to safeguard
growth.
DELOITTE UK CENTRE FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS, MEASURING THE RETURN FROM
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 2013: WEATHERING THE STORM? 2 (2013), available at
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedKingdom/Local%20Assets
/Documents/Industries/Manufacturing/uk-manufacturing-measuring-the-return
-from-pharmaceutical-innovation-2013v1.pdf.
115. A large collection of research-based pharmaceutical companies have
disappeared since 1989. The list includes companies that had been in business for
over 100 years before being eliminated through a merger. The Upjohn Company,
Wyeth, Schering-Plough, Squibb, Syntex, Warner-Lambert, A.H. Robbins,
SmithKline, Wellcome, Beecham, American Cyanamid, Sterling Winthrop,
Zeneca, Beecham, Hoechst, Marion, Mallinkrodt, Knoll, Schering AG, Alza,
McNeil Laboratories, Fisons, Ciba-Geigy, Rhône Poulenc, Synthélabo, DuPont
Pharmaceuticals, Roussel, Rorer, Farmitalia Carlo Erba, and Pharmacia are all
companies that ceased independent existence during the past twenty-five years.
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investments in developing new medicines that are, prospectively at
least, commensurate with the development risk as well as the
marketing risk. New medicines have, out of necessity, become
relatively more costly. They must be priced to pay back the
investments needed to create them and to create markets for them.
Most new medicines cannot be priced high enough to make the
116
investment in creating them a profitable one.
Medicines, once approved for marketing, do not make markets
for themselves. A new medicine, once available in the marketplace,
cannot succeed commercially without changing the practice of
medicine. For a new medicine to be used, physicians need to
understand the patients who can benefit from a new therapy,
understand the limitations on the use of the medicine, learn what
side effects to expect, and prescribe the medicine to patients who
similarly require information on what to expect (and not to
expect) from the new medicine.
The education and marketing investment needed to get a new
medicine prescribed by physicians and successfully used by patients
is enormous. The ongoing efforts to educate and promote
marketed medicines are of the same order of magnitude as the
117
ongoing R&D expenses to create them.
As noted earlier, the creation risks and marketing risks are
compounded by the need for a new medicine just coming into the
market to compete against any established medicines in the same
therapeutic class, an increasing number of which over time are
available in the form of low-cost copies. For a new medicine to
break into a market where multiple generic drugs are already
available in the marketplace—or would be available by the time the
new entrant could gain regulatory approval—requires much more
than assuring the new medicine is a safe and effective product.
It requires some basis for projecting that the clinical results
from the testing of the medicine, once completed, will produce
sufficient advantages over generic copies of all existing medicines

116. See JIM GILBERT ET AL, supra note 16.
117. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that in 2008 the cost
of developing the market from new medicines among major pharmaceutical
companies was $20.5 billion. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ECONOMIC AND ISSUE BRIEF:
PROMOTIONAL SPENDING FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 2 (2009), available at http://www
.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/105xx/doc10522/12-02-drugpromo
_brief.pdf. This compares, according to CBO numbers, with an ongoing annual
R&D cost of $38 billion for the industry. Id.
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such that patients and their insurers will be willing to pay a 50-fold
or 100-fold premium in the pricing for the new medicine. Without
the ability to make that projection, the investment to create the
new medicine—however promising otherwise—becomes irrational.
Although the generic and the innovative industries both
manufacture medicines, the generic drug industry otherwise is
everything that the innovative industry is not—and vice versa. The
generic industry was designed to exist without the need either to
discover new medicines or the need to undertake the massive
clinical effort thereafter required to get them approved for
marketing. In sum, the “product acquisition” cost for a generic
drug manufacturer is negligible.
By way of comparison, the figures set out above indicate the
relative difference in product acquisition costs as between the two
industries are three or four orders of magnitude different. The
development costs to bring a copy of a new drug to market under
the generic drug approval pathway under the Hatch-Waxman Act
are probably less than a tenth of a penny on the dollar of the
comparable cost for a biopharmaceutical company to bring the
new medicine to market. On the marketing side, the same ratio
applies. For each dollar the originator of a new drug spends to
create a market for a new medicine, the copiers can seize the
market for the medicine for less than a tenth of a penny on the
dollar of marketing spend.
The Hatch-Waxman copied products are marketed as generic
drugs. They are literally generic products. Most are unbranded. As
such they are not promoted in the marketplace—and cannot be
promoted in the marketplace. Unlike a typical manufacturer/
marketer, a generic drug manufacturer can at most assert in the
marketplace that the generic medicine is undifferentiated from the
original version of the product being copied. However, the FDA
moots even the need for a generic drug manufacturer to note that
its products are nondifferentiated. The FDA’s rating system dictates
that generic drugs meeting a bioequivalence standard are fully
118
interchangeable with the original version of the new medicine.
118. See OFFICE OF GENERIC DRUGS, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPROVED DRUG
PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS, at viii (34th ed. 2014),
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess
/UCM071436.pdf (commonly referred to as the “Orange Book”).
Under the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act of 1984, manufacturers seeking approval to market a generic drug
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In sum, generic drug manufacturers not only do not need to
brand their products, they do not need to educate physicians on
their use, or otherwise promote them. The FDA regulatory regime
provides that generic drugs are approved solely by demonstrating
bioequivalence to the new medicine that they have copied. Copied
versions of new drugs are government certified as substitutes for
the original version of the new medicine.
In the business of prescribing and dispensing medicines to
patients, generic drugs are freely substitutable and today are
typically freely substituted for the original version of the medicine.
Throughout the United States, state law requirements either
encourage or mandate that a prescription for a medicine be filled
119
with a generic copy, if available.
The net effect of these
requirements is to transfer to generic drug manufacturers, upon
generic drug entry, the bulk of the value created by the originator
of the medicine in the medicine’s trademarks and associated
goodwill.
As a result of the Hatch-Waxman regulatory regime, virtually
the only business risk faced by a generic drug manufacturer is the
risk of failing to be among the lowest-cost manufacturers of the

product must submit data demonstrating that the drug product is
bioequivalent to the pioneer (innovator) drug product. A major
premise underlying the 1984 law is that bioequivalent drug products
are therapeutically equivalent and, therefore, interchangeable.
Id.
119. Henry Grabowski, Competition Between Generic and Branded Drugs, in
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: INCENTIVES, COMPETITION, AND COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 153, 155–56 (Frank A. Sloan & Chee-Ruey
Hsieh eds., 2007).
States generally have one of two types of substitution laws:
permissive substitution laws and mandatory substitution laws.
Mandatory substitution states require that pharmacists substitute
generic drugs for branded drugs where a generic is available and other
requirements are fulfilled. Permissive substitution states allow
pharmacists to substitute generic drugs for branded drugs. According
to the 2003-2004 National Association of Boards of Pharmacy’s Survey of
Pharmacy Law (2004), 11 states and Puerto Rico had mandatory generic
substitution laws. In 38 other states plus the District of Columbia and
Guam, pharmacists were permitted, but not mandated, to substitute
generic drugs for brand name drug products. In either case, payers,
physicians, and pharmacists had a strong economic incentive to
substitute generic drugs for branded drugs.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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copied versions of a new medicine. In effect, the business model of
a generic drug manufacturer today means that generic drugs can
be profitably sold—and provide a profit for the generic drug
manufacturer proportionate to the relatively minimal risks of being
in the generic drug business—at little more than the cost to
120
manufacture those copies.
In most industry sectors, it would be difficult to explain how
the medicine-creating business could have survived the competitive
onslaught of the medicines-copying business that can both free-ride
off the R&D of the innovator and then free-ride off the marketing
investments. If there is an explanation, that explanation begins—
and perhaps ends—with IP protection. The reason that a minority
of the research-based, innovative pharmaceutical companies that
were in business at the start of the Hatch-Waxman era have
survived through today, is that their new medicines were accorded
sufficient IP protection to produce a return on the investments
needed to create them.
The importance of a secure and predictable IP regime cannot
be underestimated when the competition in the marketplace can
operate generically with a government certification of equivalence
of the products it places into the marketplace. No one can dispute
that, in IP-intensive industry sectors with significant R&D costs to
create a new product, the emergence of a government-certified
“generic copy” industry would have been the death knell for the
innovation-based industry absent sufficient IP protection from
copying.
120. A possible flaw in the generic drug business model is the loss from the
market of generic manufacturers that are not among the lowest-cost producers or,
were such manufacturers to make needed investments to remain in the
manufacturing business for a generic drug, could not retain the status as a lowestcost producer. Shortages of generic drugs have become increasingly common in
recent years, which may be attributable in part to the type of price competition has
served to limit the number of manufacturers that are in, can remain in, or can
enter the market for a particular generic medicine. As counterintuitive as it might
seem, it might be in the best interests of consumers for the FDA to be given
authority to set minimum prices at which shortage-prone generic copies of new
medicines might be sold in the marketplace. While the drug shortage topic has
been extensively studied by the FDA, their efforts may have missed the IP-related
root cause of such shortages and the facile economic solution to address that root
cause that a pricing floor might represent. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., STRATEGIC PLAN
FOR PREVENTING AND MITIGATING DRUG SHORTAGES (2013), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/DrugShortages/UCM372566
.pdf (last visited on Mar. 27, 2014).
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Imagine Microsoft staying in business selling Windows 8.1 and
its MS Office 2013 if government-certified copied versions of
Windows 7 and Office 2010 could be developed today for the
market and then sold as government-certified equivalents for
quality and functionality for little more than the cost of copying. If,
of course, Office 2013 provided revolutionary advantages for users
compared to Office 2010, it is possible that users might be willing
to pay a ten-fold higher price for the improvements in Office 2013.
However, it would take an almost unimaginably improved product
for a customer to pay a 100-fold higher price for an innovative,
branded product. If Windows 8.1 had been such a revolutionary
advance over Windows 7, then this would provide only a small bit of
breathing space for the innovator. It would then need a
comparably improved product in Windows 9 to gain market share
over a generic copy of Windows 8.1. It becomes relatively easy to
understand that protection from copying—and protection for a
significant time period—lies at the heart of an effective IP regime
that is essential for an innovation business to survive the onslaught
of competition from government-certified copies.
The risks to the survival of the remainder of the research-based
biopharmaceutical industry from the generic drug industry grow
more acute over time. Today, as noted earlier, almost every new
drug that came to market during the twentieth century now has
generic copies in the marketplace. For some important therapeutic
categories, multiple new drugs have generic copies competing in
the marketplace. With the 2014 commercial reality in mind, what
does this suggest about the MODDERN Cures Act paradigm for IP
protection vis-à-vis the Hatch-Waxman Act and the Biosimilars Act?
First, with all the risk factors faced by originators in sustaining
an innovation model, the risk of insufficient or insecure IP
protection can readily be the last straw of risk that breaks the back
of the business model. The MODDERN Cures Act was conceived as
a means of taking IP risk off the table as a reason why the
originator might not proceed to develop a promising experimental
medicine.
Second, the MODDERN Cures Act puts a stake in the ground
on what the period of IP protection should be to provide the
optimal balance between incentives for innovation and the
economic value that can arise from access to regulatory pathways
for bringing low-cost copies to market. What is the justification for
a fifteen-year IP protection period, after which copied versions of
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new medicines can be freely approved under abbreviated
regulatory approval pathways? As will be discussed below, there are
compelling reasons for the fifteen-year IP protection period
contained in the Act.
V. THE CASE FOR THE MODDERN CURES ACT: A FIFTEEN-YEAR
PATENT PROTECTION AND DATA PACKAGE PROTECTION PERIOD WITH
COPIED VERSIONS BEING FREELY MARKETED THEREAFTER
A.

The MODDERN Cures Model Eliminates Any Possible Need for Patent
Litigation-Related Provisions in the Regulatory/IP Interface

Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, patent linkage plays an
essential role in the overall IP protection regime. “Patent linkage”
means, as noted above, that the data package protection period is
ultimately the patent protection period. The only way to determine
the applicable patent protection period is to know which of the
originator’s relevant patents were valid and infringed. Once patent
linkage is elected as the governing principle for determining how
long the data package protection period will last, a cascade of
related provisions must follow to establish the subsidiary issues of
patent validity and patent infringement. This includes setting out
provisions that take account of who might sue whom, when, and
over what patents.
The MODDERN Cures Act, which uses the patent protection
period as the data package protection period, gets to exactly the
same end, but arrives from the opposite starting point. Instead of
using the vagaries of the patent protection period to define an
equally less certain and less predictable data package protection
period, the MODDERN Cures Act uses a fixed and certain data
package protection period to define an equally fixed and certain
121
patent protection period. While the Hatch-Waxman Act was
crafted on the assumption that, given patent term restoration,
there would be a floor of fourteen years of patent protection, the
MODDERN Cures Act sets out a unified IP protection of fifteen
122
years—the floor and the ceiling are at the same elevation. The
MODDERN Cures framework inherently removes the relevancy for
the Hatch-Waxman patent linkage to data protection—if anything,

121.
122.

See H.R. 3116, 113th Cong. § 201(e)(2)(C) (2013).
Id. § 201(i)(4)(B).
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it substitutes linking patents to data package protection, rather
than vice versa.
The required patent disclaimer provisions under MODDERN
Cures assure that there will be no outstanding patent rights of
123
necessary relevance once the fifteen-year protection period ends.
In the absence of patents that can be infringed after the end of the
common IP protection period, there is no reason for a generic
drug monopoly period of the type found in the Hatch-Waxman
Act. There simply will be no patent litigation related to the
approval of copied versions of new medicines—either before the
approval or after the approval. As for the patent-related provisions
of the Biosimilars Act, there is no basis for a patent dialogue
between originator and copier because there will be no relevant
patents that can be enforced by the originator against the copier
once the data package protection period ends and the copier can
secure regulatory approval to market.
The MODDERN Cures Act approach represents the superior
public policy. The patent risks and uncertainties in a patent-linked,
patent-centric system can equally bedevil both originators and
copiers. It follows that both originators and copiers benefit if those
risks can be mitigated or, as with the MODDERN Cures Act, even
eliminated. Importantly, as outlined earlier, patent perversity
disappears. The most challenging and difficult new medicines to
develop are no longer punished with disproportionately shorter IP
protection periods. The MODDERN Cures Act has provisions that
assure that, what otherwise would be pathologically short-lived
patents, will be fully restored to the end of the fifteen-year IP
protection period. The prospect of inadequate IP protection will
no longer be a factor to be weighed against bringing a promising
experimental medicine into the clinic.
An interface based entirely upon a common, fixed IP
protection period, devoid of patent linkage, can be as simple in
actual operation as the Hatch-Waxman patent-centric system is
complex. The only significant challenge in creating the new
architecture lies in optimizing the length for the protection period
itself. It must be a sufficient period for the originator of the new
medicine to have the reasonable prospect of earning back the
investment required to discover and develop the medicine through
FDA approval in the first place, but it must also assure that patients
123.

See id. § 201(c).
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will get the benefits of low-cost, copied versions of those new
medicines in as reasonably prompt a timeframe as possible.
B.

Setting the Unified IP Protection Period at Fifteen Years is the Optimal
Policy Choice
1.

Hatch-Waxman’s Fourteen-Year Patent Term Restoration Period
Translates into a Fifteen-Year IP Protection Period Taking
Account of Pediatric Exclusivity and the Generic Drug Monopoly,
Making It a Benchmark for Testing the Adequacy for the IP
Protection Period for New Medicines Directed to Unmet Medical
Needs

In economic terms, the right data package protection period
should be relatively straightforward to determine, if the objective is to
assure that the protection period is adequate, on average, for the originator
of the new medicine to be able to earn back in profits from sales revenues the
investment needed to create the new medicine in the first place. The HatchWaxman Act contained a benchmark for such a period when it
authorized patent term restoration for a fourteen-year period from
the date the original version of a new medicine was originally
approved, whether a new drug subject to the new abbreviated
approval pathways in the Act or a biologic medicine for which no
like pathway would exist until 2009. The fourteen-year period was
adopted in 1984 when—as described earlier—inventors in other
technologies might expect a seventeen-year patent life for
nonpharmaceutical patented products in any circumstance, where
the issuance of the relevant patents coincided with the time at
124
which the patented product entered the marketplace.
Under the post-1994 patent law, Congress concluded that up
to a twenty-year patent protection period could be regarded as an
appropriate IP protection period for products needing little in the
way of engineering or other development work before entering the
market. The twenty-year patent life could be achieved given the
statutory twenty-year patent term allows for an additional one-year
period during which provisional patent filings can be made before
125
the twenty years of patent life commences. If the provisional
patent year was used for the engineering and other development
124. See supra Part III.E.
125. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(3) (2006) (providing that a provisional patent
filing under 35 U.S.C. § 111(b) “shall not be taken into account in determining
the term of a patent”).
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work needed to prepare that nonpharmaceutical patented product
for the marketplace, the patents on the product would expire
twenty years after marketing of the product commenced.
An IP protection period of fourteen, seventeen, or even twenty
years would each be consistent with the Hatch-Waxman Act’s
original intent—and the intent of Congress in setting terms of
protection under patents. As noted above, when enacted in 1984,
the Hatch-Waxman law effectively created a fourteen-year floor on
126
patent life for many new medicines. Recent statistics indicate that
nearly one in three patents extended since 1984 under the HatchWaxman Act were reset to expire at the end of the fourteen-year
127
period from regulatory approval. Thus, except where patent
protection works perversely, the fourteen-year protection period
remains the historic benchmark for testing the adequacy of an IP
protection period for a new medicine—drug or biologic—coming
128
to market. In terms of a floor on protection, there would be no
reason to reject a fourteen-year protection period.
Also, as intentionally constructed, the MODDERN Cures Act
does not permit adding an additional six months of further
protection at the end of the fourteen-year patent term restoration
126. See supra note 101 (noting the 24-year effective patent life for EPOGEN).
127. See Patent Term Extensions, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www
.uspto.gov/patents/resources/terms/156.jsp (last visited Mar. 2, 2014), for a
listing of restored patent terms under 35 U.S.C. § 156, pursuant to the HatchWaxman Act. Since 1984, over 600 patents have been extended, the large majority
of which are patents claiming new medicines. The five-year or two-year limitation
on the length of the permitted period of extension limited approximately 30% of
the patents extended. Another approximately 40% of patent extension were
ultimately limited by the required deduction from the “regulatory review period”
of the testing phase of the product on which the extension was based. The final
(approximately) 30% of reported extensions were limited by the fourteen-year cap
on the patent expiration from the date of product approval.
128. Moreover, at least in some situations, the patent protection period under
the pre-1995 patent law afforded patent protection periods for new medicines of
longer than fourteen years based on patents other than the patent selected by the
originator for patent term restoration. Finally, in yet other situations no patent
term extension was ever sought under the Hatch-Waxman Act because all the
relevant patents on the new medicine had longer than fourteen years of
remaining patent life at the time the new medicine was approved. As one example,
the relevant patents for the medicine Epogen, approved in 1989, all had patent
terms extending beyond the fourteen-year Hatch-Waxman limit on patent term
restoration. The relevant Epogen patent, U.S. Patent No. 4,703,008 (filed Nov. 30,
1984), entitled “DNA Sequences Encoding Erythropoietin,” issued on October 27,
1987, less than three years from the regulatory approval for Epogen in June 1989.
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129

period based upon “pediatric investigations.” Under the HatchWaxman Act, tacking on an additional six-month pediatric
exclusivity period to the end of the fourteen-year protection period
suggests an effective floor of fourteen-and-a-half years of IP
protection would be appropriate. Additionally, Congress conceived
that an additional 180-day generic drug monopoly period might
130
apply in certain situations. When the additional period applies,
the fourteen-and-a-half-year floor on the protection period
becomes a fifteen-year period before all generic competitors are
permitted to freely enter the market.
While the framework that offered the ability to secure such a
fifteen-year protection period under the Hatch-Waxman Act is not
dispositive of its appropriateness for the MODDERN Cures Act
framework, it is relevant in one important respect. It would clearly
be perverse if medicines that were relatively simple and more
straightforward to develop could readily secure this type of fifteen131
year IP protection period under the current Hatch-Waxman Act,
but medicines addressing unmet medical needs—with much longer
routes to FDA approval—were confined to a shorter IP protection
period.
2.

A Fifteen-Year IP Protection Period Is Supported by Economic
Analysis Indicating a Fifteen-Year Period Is Typically Essential
for a New Medicine to Pay Back the Investment Made to Develop
It

The most significant work analyzing the necessary IP
protection period that would allow a new medicine to earn back for
the originator the investment needed to create the new medicine
132
was undertaken by Henry Grabowski. The Grabowski work uses a
129. See Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA),
Pub. L. No. 112-114, tit. V, 126 Stat. 993, 1039 (2012) (making permanent the
provisions of the Best Pharmaceutical for Children Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109,
115 Stat. 1408 (2002)). Under 21 U.S.C. § 355a(b)(1) (2012), an additional six
months of data package protection and effective patent protection is available for
submitting information to the FDA.
130. See supra Part III.G.
131. For example, because they could be developed so facilely that their
patent terms could be restored to the full fourteen-year period, not taking account
of the six-month pediatric extension and the 180-day generic drug monopoly
period.
132. Henry Grabowski, Follow-on Biologics: Data Exclusivity and the Balance
Between Innovation and Competition, 7 NATURE REVIEWS: DRUG DISCOVERY 479 (2008).
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pair of discount rates to calculate possible “breakeven” scenarios
133
for investments made to create new medicines. The conclusion
from his work is straightforward. An IP protection period that is
less than a term of thirteen to sixteen years would not be sufficient.
When the net present values (NPV) of inflow just equals
outflows, this is the break-even point at which a firm
recovers its R&D investment and earns a risk-adjusted rate
of return. The breakeven time is 12.9 years for a discount
134
rate of 11.5%, and 16.2 years for a 12.5% discount rate.
While this work was done on new biologic medicines, its
fundamental methodology applies to new medicines of all types—
and increasingly so, as the costs and risks of bringing new
medicines successfully to market have steadily accelerated. Under
the Grabowski analysis, it is clear that the twelve-year data package
protection period from the Biologics Act is too short by itself to
provide the necessary payback period. Moreover, as suggested by
the “patent dialogue” provisions in the Biosimilars Act, Congress
anticipated that the effective IP protection period could be
significantly longer—the longer period arising from enforcement
of patents to yield the appropriate aggregate protection period.
The MODDERN Cures Act, in the course of eliminating any
patent-based IP protection period after the end of the data package
protection period ends, employs a Grabowski-consistent period of
fifteen years. This fifteen-year protection period thus can be viewed
as neither unwarranted nor excessive given that access to this
protection period is limited to experimental medicines being
investigated to address unmet medical needs.
3.

The Fifteen-Year IP Protection Period Assures the Fullest and Best
Uses of a New Medicine Can Be Investigated and Approved for
Use in Patients

Much of the most important research on every new medicine
takes place not before, but after the FDA has approved the
medicine for use. This is the research into new indications for use,
uses to prevent and not just treat a disease, patient populations
where the medicine may be especially effective and useful (or carry

133. “The break-even lifetimes for the mean [biologic] product were found to
be between 12.9 and 16.2 years at alternative discount rates of 11.5% and 12.5%,
respectively.” Id. at 487.
134. Id. at 486 (text accompanying Figure 6).
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particular risks and liabilities), and safety issues that arise and need
to be fully understood. For this research to be sustained, and for
the fullest and best uses of the medicine to be understood and for
physicians to be fully educated on the use of the medicine by the
time generic copies arrive on the market, it is critical that
incentives exist to continue this type of post-approval research
during the decade after the medicine reaches the market.
With a fifteen-year IP protection period, the originator is
positioned to continue investments in research during the decade
after the medicine first reaches the market. If inexpensive generic
copies come to market too soon, the investment needed to create
and disseminate the information needed to put the medicine to its
fullest uses will never be made.
4.

The National Academies Recommended a Data-Package
Protection Period for Protecting All New Medicines That Is
Consistent with a Fifteen-Year Protection Period for Medicines to
Address Unmet Medical Needs

In 2007, the National Academy of Sciences, the National
Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine jointly
135
published a report in which the deficiencies of the existing data
package protection regimes for new medicines were laid out in
case-study form. The National Academies concluded that a serious
effort was needed to determine how best to balance available
patent protection for new medicines with data package
136
protection. It laid out the case for a more data-focused regime.
Pending completion of a study to determine a fully adequate
protection period, the National Academies recommended that
Congress should move ahead immediately with at least a ten- to
eleven-year period of data package protection to provide some
parity with the European data package protection regime that
currently affords up to an eleven-year protection from the approval
137
of generic copies of all new medicines.
135. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISING ABOVE THE GATHERING STORM:
ENERGIZING AND EMPLOYING AMERICA FOR A BRIGHTER ECONOMIC FUTURE (2007).
136. Id. at 190–92.
137. Id.
The demands for data on a molecule’s safety and efficacy are
increasing. The generation of the necessary data requires time and
money. It is to patients’ benefit for as much time as appropriate to be
devoted to the development of the data, but spending the time lessens
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The MODDERN Cures Act provision for a fifteen-year fixed
and common data package and patent protection period for
medicines directed to unmet medical needs is fully consistent with
138
the National Academies’ study.

the return on the developer’s investment because it encroaches on the
patent term. Bringing a new medicine to patients requires a sequence
of major breakthroughs, which in the current system must be
accomplished well before the life of a patent runs out. Often, the clock
does run out, and the innovator must start over with a new molecule
simply to get time ‘back on the clock.’ As a result, there is an ever
growing ‘graveyard’ currently comprising more than 10 million
compounds. There is no incentive to exhume these compounds in the
absence of substantial data-package exclusivity, because patents will be
either unavailable or of such narrow coverage that they would be easy
to avoid in developing a related drug.
Id. at 191.
138. One subject not addressed in this article is the issue of additional reforms
that might be appropriate once the MODDERN Cures Act is enacted into law.
One possible modification to both the Hatch-Waxman Act and the Biosimilars Act,
fully consistent with the MODDERN Cure Act principles, would be to provide an
alternative to the existing patent term restoration and data package protection
provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act with respect to any medicine for which
patent term restoration under the existing law had not been secured. Congress
could provide an originator with the option to elect a fixed IP protection period,
irrespective of whether the medicine addressed an unmet medical need. Like the
MODDERN Cures model, new patent term provisions could extend all relevant
patents of the originator of the new medicine so that they would expire at the end
of a new fourteen-year IP protection period, thereby superseding the HatchWaxman Act’s provision that only a single patent would be eligible for such a
fourteen-year post-approval patent life. This new IP protection period would
include a concurrent fourteen-year data package protection period to accompany
the patent term restoration provisions. In addition, as a prerequisite for electing
the new IP protection provisions, the originator would be required to proffer a
disclaimer of the type set out in the MODDERN Cures Act with respect to any of
the relevant patents of the originator that would expire beyond the end of the
fourteen-year IP protection period. The current provisions of the Hatch-Waxman
Act and the Biosimilars Act would then continue to apply to all new medicines for
which no election to operate under the new law was sought. This elective
framework, self-evidently, would provide benefits to both the originators of new
medicines and the copiers of those medicines and admirably serve the same policy
objectives as the MODDERN Cures Act. As such, it might be worth considering on
its merits independently of whether the MODDERN Cures Act were to become
law.
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CONCLUSION
The Hatch-Waxman Act was a bold initiative by its
congressional sponsors that today has met or exceeded all of its
expectations, at least as they related to the creation of a new
generic drug industry able to reliably supply low-cost, high-quality
copied versions of new medicines to the marketplace. The generic
manufacturers’ growing market share of the U.S. prescription drug
market suggests that nothing more is needed to further secure the
generic industry’s role as a major contributor to the health of the
American public.
The story for the research-based industry is, however, more
mixed. Over the Hatch-Waxman era, its new medicines have
revolutionized the treatment of many diseases. It has been able to
increase its R&D investments. At the same time, consolidation has
reduced the ranks of the innovators dramatically. Its declining
share of the prescription medicines business, coupled with the
relentlessness of low-cost generic competition from earliergeneration innovations of the research-based industry, makes its
future less assured.
For the research-based industry to have a reasonable
opportunity to innovate its way to a successful future, it is critical
that it be able to focus the talents of its researchers on the best
ideas for new medicines. This requires some assurance that, if those
ideas are successfully brought through the research process to the
market, fair and predictable protection from low-cost generic and
other low-cost, follow-on competition will exist—and will continue
for a period sufficient to create a reasonable prospect of paying
back the investment in the research needed to get those medicines
to market.
It should be unacceptable to all the relevant constituencies—
patients, providers of healthcare, third-party payors, and public
health policymakers—that a highly promising experimental
medicine cannot proceed into development because its projected
patent life is too short, the patent protection seems too tenuous, or
patent protection was simply unavailable. By adopting the
MODDERN Cures Act’s fixed and certain fifteen-year IP protection
period for medicines directed to unmet medical needs, patients
and their physicians could gain access to the best new choices in
therapy—with the best and most complete uses of those medicines
fully elaborated through continuing, post-approval research. When
low-cost copied versions of those new medicines take over the
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market from the original version of the medicine, the market will
be a fully developed one in which the best and most complete uses
of those medicines will be well understood by physicians.
In the foreword to this issue, Senator Hatch suggests that the
success of the Hatch Waxman Act might “inspire[] ideas on how to
139
improve the effects of the Act through additional legislation.”
That, in a nutshell, was the intent of this article, namely that the
MODDERN Cures Act holds the promise of being a more modern
incarnation of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Congress can achieve a
“win-win-win” outcome through the MODDERN Cures Act.
Innovators of new medicines would be freed to do what they do
best—create the best in new medicines for patients, irrespective of
whether those new medicines have the best patents. Copiers would
gain easy and predictable access to the new medicine’s market once
a fixed IP protection period ends. Above all, patients would secure
the benefits from the best of both worlds—new medicines that
come from a focus on addressing today’s unmet medical needs and
high-quality copies of these new medicines that then become
reliably available at the lowest possible cost.
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